

point and count the ~~opportunities~~ ~~for~~ ~~release~~ 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000300170021-8 measure their degree of readiness; it was also able to tell the President almost exactly how the Soviet strategic order of battle across the world—bombers and rockets and long-range submarine—compared to our own. Probably never before in history has a head of state entered a war situation so well informed of the adversary's strengths and weaknesses as was Kennedy in October, 1962, or, for that matter, with so absolute a knowledge of the overwhelming advantages that lay with him across the board.

Nearly 2 years after the October affair, the President's closest adviser on national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, was to supply a strange epilogue in an article published in the April issue of Foreign Affairs. "The October crisis," Bundy concludes, "came out better than President Kennedy or any of his associates had expected." Considering that he had been caught redhanded and that the power factors were hopelessly stacked against him, Khrushchev would seem to have had the better reason, as he closed the books on the Cuba incident, to think that matters had turned out better for him than he had a right to expect. For one thing, he was permitted to bring the rockets home under a safe-conduct pass, without the on-the-spot inspection that the Americans had first demanded. For another, he and Castro believed that they had an American promise not to invade Cuba so long as the rockets didn't return. And, finally, the U.S. middle-range rockets based in Turkey and Italy, in the NATO interest, were dismantled and taken away, as Khrushchev long had demanded.

A FLEETING OPPORTUNITY

As matters turned out, Cuba was the last of Khrushchev's shoestring operations against the United States. Meanwhile, it appears that the United States passed up what some observers think was a truly extraordinary opportunity in the western Pacific. By early 1962, U.S. intelligence was in possession of information that much of Red China was in ferment. Tens of thousands of refugees were pressing against the gates of Macao and Hong Kong; harvests had failed; there were public demonstrations, even rioting, by the hungry; in some communities the militia had refused to act against the people and certain detachments had in fact mutinied. At this point President Chiang Kai-shek pressed Washington for permission to attempt to establish a beachhead on the mainland with his own forces. The American decision was to leave matters as they were in China. Not only was the weight of American influence thrown on the side of restraining Chiang. The State Department was also assuring Peiping, through third parties, that if Chiang did start off, he would be on his own. It is now recognized in knowledgeable circles in Washington, however, that a demonstration by Chiang, with U.S. power, on the flanks and rear, would have subjected the Peiping regime to a test it was ill equipped to meet. Firmness on the U.S. part in the interest of an ally would have brought about at least an ebbing, perhaps even an end, to Mao's menace in Asia.

By the beginning of the 1960's the executive branch of the Government had both the information and the power to call Khrushchev's bluff and to finish off Castro. That we did not do so was due in part to a want of resolution, which one may hope will now be surmounted. For today the United States clearly stands at the pinnacle of power. The Communist system stands second, a very weak second—weak militarily, weak economically and industrially, weak in its international political connections.

EDUCATION AND TAX SOURCES

NEWSLETTER BY SENATOR THURMOND

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on January 15, 1965, I introduced a number of legislative proposals for consideration by the Senate. Among these was Senate bill 542, which would eliminate the Federal excise tax on alcohol and tobacco products. The purpose of this proposed legislation is set forth in my weekly newsletter dated January 18, 1965, and entitled "Education and Tax Sources."

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this newsletter be printed at this point in the Record, so that the purpose of this proposed legislation can be studied and considered by all who are concerned with the problem of providing additional funds for education without further intrusion of the Federal Government into this area of activity, which under the Constitution has been reserved for State and local governments.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

EDUCATION AND TAX SOURCES
(By STROM THURMOND, U.S. Senator from South Carolina)

The 89th Congress has been asked by President Johnson to approve a massive program of general Federal aid to education.

There is little question about the importance of education. It is vital to our people for many reasons, foremost among these being the paramount responsibility of self-government. Great strides have been made in the individual States to increase the quality of public education. In fact, public education spending by the States has tripled in the past 12 years.

Long ago our Founding Fathers determined that the task of public education must be a responsibility of local government. They realized that education controlled by a central government could be used, as could a centralized police power, to destroy local self-government and individual liberty in the interest of establishing a monarchy or dictatorship.

Also, the Founding Fathers recognized that more and better education could be obtained for the dollar if administered by a local school board. Thus, the field of education was never delegated to the Federal Government under the Constitution, but rather was reserved to the States. In fact, the word "education" is not to be found in the Constitution. Because of this clear lack of constitutional authority, supporters of general Federal aid to education have in the past proposed only indirect or limited programs for the purpose of getting the "camel's nose under the tent." Even the national defense clause in the Constitution has been used in an effort to pervert the intent of the Constitution rather than seeking to amend the Constitution.

For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1965, the President has requested authority to spend approximately one-third as much as is now being spent for education by all the States. This money will go to public, private, and church-supported schools at all levels, beginning with kindergarten and extending through college postgraduate work. Each year the Federal spending will go higher until total control and responsibility rests in Washington with Federal bureaucrats spelling out the contents of textbooks and curriculums and controlling teacher pay and standards.

The recent orders enforcing the fund withholding provisions of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide all the proof necessary on the element of control which lurks behind all Federal aid dollars.

There is a good alternative for all Federal aid to public education, and I have introduced legislation to make this alternative possible. The President is suggesting the elimination of some Federal excise taxes. I have thus proposed that the Federal Government withdraw its excise taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products so the States can have the full benefit of these tax sources. In 1963, the Federal Government collected approximately \$6 billion in taxes on alcohol and tobacco. All States now tax alcohol and tobacco, but they are limited in their revenues here as elsewhere by the intrusion of the Federal Government.

In fact, preemption of tax sources by the Federal Government is one of the primary reasons for the gradual erosion of State and local powers of government and the shift of more and more authority to Washington.

If the President truly is concerned about promoting more progress in education and States responsibilities—as well as preserving States rights and our Federal system of divided powers—then he should support this proposal to keep tax dollars at home so progress for the people can be promoted at the appropriate level of government. He could also back a proposal I am cosponsoring to provide a tax credit for taxpayers who spend money to pay education expenses of students.

The only feature lacking in these two proposals is the element of control—which, in his education message, the President professed not to desire.

Sincerely,

STROM THURMOND.

THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, last Saturday, January 16, 1965, Henry Cabot Lodge, our eminent and distinguished former colleague, addressed the 49th annual convention of the National Association of Secondary School Principals in Miami on the struggle being waged in Vietnam. The address is timely, and his views deserve careful attention as we consider South Vietnam and the programs of U.S. assistance there, as well as possible alternatives in policy. I ask unanimous consent that this address, containing important observations obtained by Ambassador Lodge in his experience in Vietnam, be inserted in the Record.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SPECH BY THE HONORABLE HENRY CABOT LODGE, JANUARY 16, 1965, FOUNTAINBLEAU HOTEL, MIAMI BEACH, AT THE 49TH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, you represent such a tremendous influence on America's youth and, therefore, such a decisive factor in America's destiny that it is indeed a privilege for me to have you give me a hearing tonight.

I submit some thoughts, born of personal experience, about Vietnam and what I say will be in two parts: First, on why Vietnam is important; and second, on what is the nature of the problem.

1. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Geographically, Vietnam stands at the hub of a vast area of the world—southeast Asia—

an area with a population of 200 million people extending 2,000 miles from north to south, and 3,000 miles from east to west. The Mekong River, one of the 10 largest rivers in the world, reaches the sea in South Vietnam. He who holds or has influence in Vietnam can affect the future of the Philippines and Formosa to the east, Thailand and Burma with their huge rice surpluses to the west, and Malaysia and Indonesia with their rubber, oil and tin to the south. Japan is deeply concerned. All this affects Australia and New Zealand. Vietnam thus does not exist in a geographical vacuum—from it large storehouses of wealth and population can be influenced and undermined.

Historically, Vietnam has long played a part in the political development of the Far East. For many centuries it was under the occupation or influence of the Chinese and was used by the Chinese as a means of enforcing their hegemony over the whole of southeast Asia. The Vietnamese did not enjoy this experience and have traditionally done what they could to throw off Chinese overlordship.

But today Vietnam should be seen as one more instance in a long series of events which began in Iran, Turkey, and Greece after World War II: which includes the seizure of Czechoslovakia; which led to the Marshall plan in Europe; which caused the Korean war, the Malayan emergency, the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, and the Berlin crisis. In all these widely separated places the Communist bloc has tried to subvert and to undermine the free world in order to spread their monolithic control and their suppression of freedom.

In opposing this Communist onslaught, the free world has stood together for nearly two decades. One manifestation of our common determination to frustrate the Communist design to conquer Europe was the creation of NATO. Elsewhere in the world we have formed other alliances. The United States alone has suffered 160,000 casualties since the end of World War II in this effort to contain the spread of communism.

This worldwide effort by nations of the free world has not been undertaken out of a simple quixotic delight to engage in battles in distant places. Nor does it signify a desire to establish a new colonialism or any kind of special position. The war in Vietnam is not only the struggle of a small nation to exist, but it is also an open encounter between the doctrine that "wars of revolution," as the Communists call them, are the wave of the future, and our belief that in the future nations should be allowed to develop their own destinies free from outside interference.

Although the North Vietnamese have their own motives for their aggression in South Vietnam and have played the leading role, they have always been backed by the Chinese Communists. Should their aggression be successful, the Chinese Communists will have seen positive proof that their approach to international relations is correct.

Such an outcome might well lead the Soviets, in their desire to retain the leadership of the Communist bloc, to adopt a more belligerent stance in their relations with the outside world. This would surely affect the West.

It would also be regarded everywhere as a reflection of the inability or lack of will of the free world to prevent aggression. What, for example, would be the reaction in Europe if the United States were to withdraw from southeast Asia in the face of its commitment to assist?

The state of public opinion in the United States itself would also be affected. Should Vietnam be lost, many voices would be heard urging us in effect to "resign from the world" to fall back onto our "fortress America," and to gird up our loans for a contest with guided missiles. This too would be some-

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part of the war in South Vietnam. Neutralism that does not include some means of enforcement, that does not include North Vietnam, that means that South Vietnam will be alone and disarmed, is nothing more than surrender. It should be opposed for Vietnam just as it is opposed for Berlin or for Germany.

In truth both Vietnams are "neutralized" now by article 10 of the Geneva accord of July 21, 1954, which said: "The two parties shall insure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy." This provision has been formally appended by article 5 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954 in which the U.S.S.R., Red China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam participated.

We must therefore insist before there is any discussion of a conference or of neutralism, that the Communists stop their aggression and live up to the agreements which already exist. The minute the onslaught ceases, there can be peace. At present the North Vietnamese seem only to understand force, and, of course, when they use force they must be met with force as they were in the Gulf of Tonkin. They should also be met with the strong and united opposition of the free world.

It seems that conflicts in far-off places are precisely those which have often brought war and calamity to all of us. Manchuria seemed far away in 1931; the subversion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler seemed remote to the United States in 1938. Yet the result was an untold outpouring of blood and treasure. Persistence, and unity in the face of Communist pressure have succeeded in Europe and in southeast Asia, and can succeed again.

2. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

What you have in Vietnam is a new kind of fighting man. He is as distinct as the infantryman or the aviator. He is the terrorist. He's not only different from the infantryman and the aviator—he's different from a guerrilla fighter. He dresses like everybody else—and in those hot countries, a man wears a pair of pants and a top, and that's what the terrorist wears. But he's part of a very elaborate organization. He is carefully controlled, protected, and guided.

He'll be told, for example, to go in and terrorize some village where the Vietcong want to take over. So, Monday morning there will be 12 bodies on the street—old men, women, children. Nobody's done anything—nobody's guilty—they're just picked indiscriminately. The idea is to create terror. Then they'll kidnap the village chief, cut off his head, put it on a pole, and walk it around. Well, by 3 o'clock in the afternoon you don't have too much trouble getting 17- or 18-year-old boys to join the Vietcong. It's just as simple as that.

Now, you don't get rid of this kind by putting in an infantry battalion. The infantry battalion comes in and it stays around for however long it wants to. The terrorists disappear into the houses—the girls and pains leave houses of the inhabitants. Then the battalion moves on; it can't stay there forever. And the terrorist comes again. Nothing has been accomplished. In fact in many ways the situation is worse because a number of innocent people have been killed. You don't get rid of the terrorist by bombing, because if you drop a bomb and you kill 20 people, 18 of them are women and children, who have got nothing to do with the terrorist at all, and there's only one terrorist. So, that isn't any good—because the terrorist is in among the people.

Well, therefore, is it hopeless? No, it isn't hopeless. But you've got to organize the totality of the population—all of the people

pie—to protect the local village officials, and that means you get a good man in each precinct—the smallest unit of government—to be chairman, and a good committee of young men who have a stake in the community, who have a family, who own a farm, or who own a home, or who want to get ahead in business or something—and you form a counterterrorist precinct committee.

And then, with the help of the police—and where there isn't any police (and there isn't any in most places in Vietnam), you have the Army and the local militia backing you. You then conduct a census, issue identification cards, have a curfew, and everybody who is out after 8 o'clock has to explain why, or, if he doesn't, they give him the business. And thus you go through each precinct with a fine-tooth comb.

Now, that's how you get rid of terrorism. And it isn't very fast, but it can be very sure. It has worked in many places where it has been tried—in Kuala Lumpur; in Algiers; in the Philippines; and in the city of Saigon.

And then everybody gives the village chief and the chief of police where there is one some confidence that he may be going to live, and then he in turn can interest himself in the security of the people, and you begin to get an upward spiral. And then you can bring in your doctors, and your school-teachers, and your weildiggers, and the animal husbandry people—and all the other people that make life worth while. So, that's one part of the problem.

One of the best things that any American has ever said about Indochina that I've read was said by the late Gen. Bedell Smith, who was the U.S. representative at Geneva in 1954, after the French had been defeated at Dienbienphu. Georges Bidault, who was then the Prime Minister of France, told Bedell Smith that he was thinking of relieving General Navarre because of the defeat at Dienbienphu. And General Bedell Smith said, "Any second-rate general could win in Indochina if there were a proper political atmosphere." A profound remark.

Because, you see, in this struggle there's no front, there's no rear, there are no flanks—and when the fighter wants to hide, he goes into the average Vietnamese man's home. When he wants to rest, he goes into the average Vietnamese man's home. When he wants something to eat, he goes into the average Vietnamese man's home. If he's wounded and he wants to get taken care of, he goes into the average Vietnamese man's home. If he wants information as to what the army is doing, and as to what the Americans are doing, he goes into the Vietnamese home—and the old lady, the old grandmother who is 85 years old, she can sit there and see what goes on, and she can tell him all about what she sees on the road—if she wants to.

Well, now, the minute the everyday citizen, living in his home in Vietnam, says to the Vietcong, "You can't come in here to hide, you can't come in here to sleep and rest, you can't come in here to get food, you can't come here to have your wounds bound up—we aren't going to give you any information"—the war's over.

I was asked this question recently: "I suppose when we get rid of this instability, then we can go ahead and win the war." I said: "When you get rid of the instability, there isn't any war. The instability is the problem."

This is an oriental country, a tropical country. Now think of what that means. In the tropics, nature is rich—much, much, richer than it is in the north. So, a poor man, living in the Mekong Delta looks at the water of the rice paddy where the rice grows and sees fresh water fish swimming around. There are also ducks swimming on the surface, that eat the fish. Then no place in Vietnam is far from the ocean. So this poor

man can eat rice, fresh water fish, duck, and some of the most marvelous salt water fish in the world out of the South China Sea. There are also coconuts and pineapples and all manner of vegetables. Living right there, he can, for next to nothing, have a perfectly marvelous diet without traveling more than a few hundred yards.

So this oriental and tropical Vietnamese has everything he needs close to home. But, in addition to being oriental and tropical, he is also often a Confucianist. This means reverence for one's ancestors; it means great loyalty to family and to the small local group consisting largely of relatives and near-relations. This is the loyalty which counts for him above all others—for which he is willing to die.

How natural for some of these oriental, tropical, and Confucianist Vietnamese to say to themselves: "Why should I extend my frontiers 500 miles and pay taxes, and have an army, and a navy, and a diplomatic corps, and all the trappings of a Western nation-state, when I don't need it? It's all right for these people in the North—they have to, but I don't need to." And, this would be an unanswerable argument—if it were not for Communist China. It is the nearness of Communist China which means that they must become a modern nation-state in order to survive. In 1954 more Vietnamese realized this than in 1954. But it still goes against their traditions.

Thus the concept of national government does not mean there what it meant in the West. And a loyalty to such groups as Hoa Hao and Cao Dai have a vitality for which there is no counterpart in the West.

So, what you see there—and I think I may have invented a word for it—is a strong sense of peoplehood—and of group and family loyalty—but not the same sense of nationhood that we have. These people think of themselves as Vietnamese, as being of a distinct race, which they are—you don't have to be there 5 minutes before you see that. They think of themselves as having their own language, which they have—their own literature, their own art, their own history. They go way back—it's a very old civilization. They do not want to be overwhelmed and absorbed by the Chinese. But their "peoplehood" often doesn't involve the same attitude toward the flag, and the Republic, and the nation, and all those things that in the West we go out and die for.

These people are brave. I must have talked with 50 of our young West Point captains, and, believe me, there are some young men that we can all be proud of. They're with the Vietnamese army battalions. They are enthusiastic about the bravery of the Vietnamese soldier—his courage, his toughness, the long-suffering quality that he has. But his loyalty has a Vietnamese quality to it. He is loyal to his group, he is loyal to his region, he is loyal to his unit. In our own Western European history many years ago—there was, for example, the Duke of Burgundy, and the Duke of Normandy, and the Duke of Picardy, and finally it was put together and became France. Well, this country is evolving from this medieval lack of national organization into the 20th century. It's making progress. But it isn't—and it never was the same kind of country that we have in the West, and it shouldn't be judged that way.

In the case of Malaya, it took 12½ years to win the struggle against the Vietcong of Malaya. And the thing that turned the balance against the Vietcong, was when a political arrangement was reached between the Malay community and the Chinese community. When that was reached, then they were on their way. And I believe that, when a settlement is reached between the principal communities within Vietnam, then that

will be the beginning of a new day for that country.

In conclusion: The struggle in Vietnam is an example of Mao Tse-tung's statement that "politics is war without bloodshed and war is politics with bloodshed." Thus, politics and war are opposite sides of a coin—or, as has been said, "the two wheels, or wings, of statecraft." Armed combat is thus only one—and not necessarily the most important—segment of war.

The struggle in Vietnam is thus not a war in the sense that World War II—or Korea—was a war, because total military success in Vietnam unaccompanied by success in other fields, will not bring victory. A many-sided effort is needed; no single effort will solve the problem; the problem is thus the despair of the headline writer and of the political stump speaker or of any kind of black and white phraseology.

Therefore, those who try to make you think that there is a quick solution or a simple solution or an exclusively military solution are doing you as much of a disservice as are those who tell you that there is no hope, that we must pull out and that another southeast Asian conference (added to the two which have been already held—and dishonored) will do other than turn South Vietnam over to the Communists.

They also do you a disservice who deny that much has been achieved, that the military program, the economic program, the social program, the informational program and the various technical programs have all accomplished much—have indeed built the springboard of victory—and that it is the political, counter-subversive, counter-terrorist program which still needs special attention.

It is accurate to say that a glass is half full of water and it is equally accurate also to say that a glass is half empty. To dwell on the fact that we have not achieved victory does not negate the other fact that we have prevented defeat—and that a stalemate is much better than a defeat.

It is not the American tradition to get panicky whenever there is rough weather—and to get desperate whenever it becomes clear—as it does every day—that a quick purely military victory is impossible. If we decide only to interest ourselves in the nice, quiet, neat countries (which do not need our help) and abandon all the rough, tough, difficult places to the Communists, we will soon find ourselves surrounded by a rough, tough world which is aimed straight at the destruction of the United States and which will make our present effort in Vietnam seem mild indeed. Win or lose, the stakes in Vietnam are enormous. And we need not lose.

THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM CONTINUES

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, a recent editorial in the Washington Post, commenting on a study by the National Committee for an Effective Congress, reminds us that the need for congressional reform continues.

The recent changes in the rules of the other body are a recognition of this fact; and I am hopeful that, before long, both bodies will join in enacting legislation to set up a Joint Committee on the Modernization of Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the U.S. Senate in the 88th Congress, 2d session, passed a bill authorizing the construction of the initial 250,000-acre phase of the Garrison diversion unit, and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the same session, reported out favorably and recommended for passage a bill, H.R. 1003, as amended, authorizing the construction of the initial phase of the Garrison diversion unit, which report and amended bill were acceptable to the sponsors of the reauthorizing legislation, but said H.R. 1003 failed to receive House action because of lack of time before sine die adjournment of the 88th Congress: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of North Dakota, the Senate concurring therein: That the 39th Legislative Assembly of the State of North Dakota hereby expresses its unequivocal support for the early development of the Garrison diversion unit and fully concurs in and endorses the presentations by Gov. William L. Guy and other proponent witnesses at the hearings in the 88th Congress on S. 178 and H.R. 1003, and companion bills; and be it further

Resolved, That the 89th Congress be and it is hereby most respectfully urged to take early action to effect enactment of legislation authorizing the construction of the Garrison diversion unit along the lines of S. 34, H.R. 1718, and H.R. 237, 89th Congress; and be it further

Resolved, That copies hereof be transmitted by the secretary of state to the Members of the North Dakota congressional delegation, the chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water and Power, and the Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation.

ARTHUR A. LINK,
Speaker of the House.
DONNELL HONGEN,
Chief Clerk of the House.
CHARLES TIGHE,
President of the Senate.
GERALD L. STAN,
Secretary of the Senate.

EARLY AND FULL DEBATE ON SOUTH VIETNAM IMPERATIVE

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last Friday, January 15, 1965, the able and distinguished senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], one very well versed in the foreign affairs of the United States, stated:

The Senate has a responsibility in the field of foreign affairs. We have suffered from too much conformity of thought on the matter of Vietnam. A dissent constructively expressed, indeed, a full-fledged debate on the subject of Vietnam, is long overdue. At the very least, such a debate would give the American people a better idea of the alternatives available to us. It would give the President more elbow room, should he need it, within which to deal with this difficult situation in southeast Asia.

I concur wholeheartedly in Senator CHURCH's recognition of the need for a full, frank, and open debate in the U.S. Senate of the situation in South Vietnam. The American people have a right to demand such a debate on a subject matter so important to their future welfare and to the welfare of the Nation as a whole.

As a matter of fact such debate has already started.

In the issue of the American Legion magazine for August 1964, some of the pro and con arguments for our present position in South Vietnam are set forth by the able and distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] and myself. I ask unanimous consent that those arguments under the heading "Should U.S. Troops Be Withdrawn From Vietnam?" be printed in full in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last Sunday, January 17, 1965, in the New York Times Magazine a similar discussion of the pros and cons of our continued unilateral presence in South Vietnam by the able and distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], and the former Ambassador to South Vietnam, Mr. Lodge, were set forth. I ask unanimous consent that this discussion also be printed in full in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, both of these debates in the Nation's periodicals serve a most useful purpose. But the debate on South Vietnam should be brought to the Senate floor for here there can be give and take which in years past has been used so often to focus public attention on vital issues.

And at this time there can be no more vital issue than our future course of action in South Vietnam.

The U.S. position in South Vietnam is steadily deteriorating. It is deteriorating despite the massive military and financial aid the United States is increasingly pouring into that country and despite the stepup and extension of our Air Force bombings which, although they have been going on for some time, were revealed to the American people only by the shooting down of two of our planes.

Not only is the stability of the Government of South Vietnam ebbing and flowing from day to day, but it seems to be losing—if indeed it ever had—the confidence and support of an increasing segment of the people. I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at the conclusion of these remarks a report by United Press International in the New York Times for January 18, 1965, entitled "Four Students Shot in Vietnam as Rioting Sweeps Two Cities."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, as further indication of the rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and the impossibility of U.S. fighting advisers replacing South Vietnamese troops lacking the will to fight, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a dispatch by Jack Langguth in the New York Times for today, January 19, 1965, entitled, "Thirty Percent of Vietnam Draftees Desert Within 6 Weeks."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in an excellent editorial published in the Christian Science Monitor for January 18, 1965, entitled, "Delay or Diplomacy in Vietnam," the alternatives facing the United States are set forth clearly and concisely. I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 5.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the time is long overdue for the full airing on the floor of the Senate of all the facts on the U.S. position in South Vietnam and for a discussion of the alternative choice for future action open to the United States legally, morally, militarily, and politically.

It is my earnest hope that such a debate will take place without delay and will be participated in by as many of my colleagues as possible.

[From American Legion magazine, August 1964]

EXHIBIT 1

SHOULD U.S. TROOPS BE WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM?

YES

(By Senator ERNEST GRUENING, Democrat, of Alaska)

The war in South Vietnam is not and never has been a U.S. war. It is and must remain a fight to be fought and won by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

Will to fight and will to win must come from the spirit of the South Vietnamese. The United States cannot instill that will in them. For the past 14 years, U.S. military and economic aid to South Vietnam has totaled nearly \$3 billion, but despite statements of leaders of both political parties, Vietnam continues to be rocked by internal strife which drains the nation of its resources.

The root of the present dilemma in which the United States finds itself in South Vietnam lies in the aftermath of France's defeat at Dienbienphu on May 7, 1954. Today—10 years later—the U.S. position resembles that of France although we haven't used a quarter of a million troops, yet.

Those who compare South Vietnam today with South Korea of the 1950's make a great mistake. South Korea had the will to fight and to win. South Korea was a country invaded from the north—South Vietnam is a country divided within itself by a civil war. More important—in Vietnam we are alone; in Korea we were in there as part of the United Nations effort.

Where are our allies in South Vietnam? Over 200 Americans have been killed in South Vietnam, as we fight alone. Prospects are that we will continue to do so.

The theory was advanced by the late John Foster Dulles that the United States must keep South Vietnam strong to prevent the fall of Cambodia and Laos to Red China like a row of dominoes. We poured aid money into each domino, including \$300 million into Cambodia, yet it recently neutralized itself and fell of its own accord, thereby voiding the Dulles progression theory advanced during the Eisenhower administration.

I consider the life of one American worth more than this putrid mess. Let us do a little hard rethinking. Must the United States be expected to jump into every fracas

all over the world, to go it all alone, at the cost of our youngsters' lives, to stay blindly and stubbornly when a decade of bitter experience has shown us that expenditure of blood and treasure has resulted in failure?

The time has come to reverse our policy of undertaking to defend areas such as South Vietnam, whose people are so reluctant to fend for themselves. Let us keep on, by all means, supplying them with arms. Let us continue to give them the means if they wish to use them. But not our men.

We must reassess the Dulles doctrine of seeking to engage communism on its own ground—12,000 miles away.

The situation in South Vietnam and elsewhere in southeast Asia cries out for international solution. The problem will not be resolved in battle but around a conference table. The United Nations is such a conference table.

NO

(By Senator LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Republican, of Massachusetts)

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam would assure the Communists of victory there and result in a drastic defeat for the United States—morally, politically, and psychologically.

The issues at stake in South Vietnam reach far beyond our minimum objective of preserving the non-Communist social order of that country. The war in Vietnam is a struggle for the survival of U.S. leadership in the fight against Communist expansion, not only in southeast Asia but throughout the world. Those who propose U.S. withdrawal, a negotiated settlement, or the neutralization of South Vietnam as alternative solutions for terminating the conflict there, have failed to grasp this underlying significance of the war and the importance of its outcome upon the U.S. world position.

While it may be debatable whether we were prudent in doing so, nevertheless, the unalterable fact remains that the prestige of the United States has been fully committed to the prevention of a Communist takeover of South Vietnam. If the United States should fail to honor that commitment by disengaging from South Vietnam, our default was disastrously affect world opinion and would surely be construed by the nations of the world as evidence of our weakness and vacillation in coming to grips with communism.

Moreover, from the military standpoint, the U.S. formula for advising and assisting the South Vietnamese to resist Communist-inspired wars of national liberation rests in the new concept of counterinsurgency—now undergoing its acid test in the rice paddies of the Mekong River Delta. If this defensive concept fails in its purpose to overcome the creeping aggressions of Communist guerrilla warfare, the United States will have to admit to a military defeat in being incapable of devising effective military tactics to cope with that type of warfare. As a consequence, an increase in guerrilla wars can surely be anticipated not only in southeast Asia but throughout the world as communism expands without U.S. military hindrance or resistance.

Politically, a defeat in South Vietnam will be the catalyst for the nations of the Orient to align themselves with Communist China which would, as a result of U.S. disengagement, become the dominating influence of all of Asia. Should South Vietnam fall, it is more than likely that communism would eventually triumph in southeast Asia through subversion, bloodless coups, or guerrilla wars.

The neutralization of South Vietnam is appealing in principle but it has thus far failed in Laos. Similarly, a settlement under United Nations auspices is attractive in principle, but there is no assurance that the Communists would not undermine and subvert United Nations efforts in South Vietnam as they did in the Congo.

The United States, whether rightly or wrongly, is so involved morally, militarily and politically, and its prestige so fully committed in South Vietnam that it cannot countenance a defeat there. Consequently, under present conditions U.S. troops cannot be withdrawn if we are to avoid serious international repercussions.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times Magazine, Jan. 17, 1965]

WE MUST LEAVE VIETNAM

(By WAYNE MORSE)

Ten years ago the United States embarked upon an adventure in South Vietnam that was just about 100 years out of date. While Britain, France, and the Netherlands were terminating their rule over their Asiatic colonies, the United States began trying to establish its own beachhead on the Asiatic mainland.

Although present at the Geneva Conference of 1954, which drew up the accord whereby France withdrew from its old colony of Indochina, the United States refused to sign the final agreement. So did one of the subdivisions of Indochina, South Vietnam. The United States began a heavy program of financial and military aid to a new Premier in South Vietnam who, we believed, was most likely to preserve a Western orientation. When it came time for the 1956 election throughout both North and South Vietnam required by the Geneva accord, we and our client in Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, realized it would be won by Ho Chi Minh's followers not only in his own North Vietnam but in the South as well. South Vietnam refused to proceed with the election.

In the last decade we have explained our policy as one of helping a free government resist Communist subversion. But South Vietnam never has had a free government. In its 10 years of existence its governments have been picked for it by the United States and maintained by our heavy doses of economic and military aid.

The fraudulence of our claim has been starkly exposed by the successive coups in Saigon and by the piecing together of one government after another by the American Embassy. Leaders suspected of favoring neutralism or any form of negotiation for settlement of the civil war are firmly excluded from Government ranks. The major tools we have used in manipulating political and military leaders have been various threats and promises regarding our aid, which now hovers around the level of \$600 million a year in a country of 14 million people. This sum is exclusive of the cost of keeping 28,000 American "advisers" and large contingents of aircraft in the country.

In fact, our official explanations of why we are there now play down the "helping a free government" line and play up American security and American prestige as the stakes in Vietnam. At least, the explanations are getting closer to the truth, which is that the United States took over this quarter of Indochina in 1954 when the French pulled out. Having intruded ourselves into southeast Asia, where we never were before, it was this country and not the Communists who made our prestige in Asia the issue.

Our Secretary of State often says that "China must leave her neighbors alone." Under this premise, our officials have vaguely threatened to expand the war to North Vietnam and possibly China if we cannot win in South Vietnam. But there are no Chinese forces in South Vietnam nor Chinese equipment in appreciable amount. Americans are still the only foreign troops in South Vietnam.

Nonetheless, China has the same interest in what goes on in the subcontinent of southeast Asia as we have in Mexico, Cuba, and

other countries of Latin America. She will increasingly resist having hostile governments on her borders, as do Russia and the United States. We recognize and accept this principle as regards Russia, but we refused to recognize it as regards China.

This has been true even though we have watched other Western nations ousted from Asia and Africa by rising nationalism. It was inevitable that once China became part of this tide she would reassert her interest in the governments on her borders. A reawakened China would assert this interest whether she were Communist or not. The more we escalate the Vietnam conflict, the more likely China is to intervene directly.

In South Vietnam, we invite China's apprehension, but more than that, in trying to surround China with American bases and pro-Western states, we have to buck not only communism but anticolonialism. One of our many mistakes is to equate the two, especially when antiwhite feeling is directed against the United States. Advocates of a containment policy for China, similar to that applied to Russia with some success in the late 1940's and 1950's, overlook the impossibility of maintaining Western strongholds in Asia, no matter what their purpose. What we could do in white Europe and even the Middle East is not to be imposed upon an Asia that is united in at least one respect—its determination to see the white man sent back to his own shores.

With our great wealth we can sustain the current war effort in Vietnam indefinitely, even if it is escalated. But it will never end because our presence and our selection of Saigon's rulers will always inspire rebellion.

Far from maintaining our prestige in Asia, our present policy in Vietnam is eroding it. The fact that we are losing despite the steady increase in our aid, the addition of 23,000 American advisers, and complete American air domination, has already led several Asian nations to throw out an anchor on the Chinese side. Of the famous dominoes that were all supposed to fall to China if we failed to take up the French burden in southeast Asia, Burma and Cambodia have already neutralized themselves. Pakistan has made it clear that the aid she gets from us is directed against India and not against China, Japan and India, the largest non-Communist nations of Asia, who might be expected to be the most helpful to us in Vietnam, have not associated themselves with what we are doing there. A few days ago India's Premier Shastri urged a new international conference to negotiate a settlement. He asked the United States not to press for a military decision and urged that we avoid a major military conflict.

Of all the nations touted as potential Chinese victims, only Australia and the Philippines have offered tangible help in South Vietnam. The Australian contribution amounts to some 66 advisers and 3 air-cargo planes. The Philippine offer of a force of volunteer veterans was turned down.

That is the extent of the local interest and support for the American view that we are saving all of Asia from communism by our policy in Vietnam. Surely if one of these so-called dominoes believed it, they would be fighting side by side with us in Vietnam. They are not, because they see us having to run faster and faster just to stay in the same place in Vietnam. They see that the bulk of its people are too indifferent to American objectives to resist the Vietcong. They know that sooner or later we will have to leave and they do not want to jeopardize their own standing in Asia by supporting a last-minute white intervention.

There are many ways this country could crawl back from the limb we crawled out on 10 years ago. Through the Southeast

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Asia Treaty Organization, the United Nations or a reconvened Geneva conference we could seek to establish an international presence in Vietnam to stabilize and pacify the country while it develops political institutions. Our refusal to sign the accord of 1954 has always made suspect our claim that we were enforcing it.

In truth, our enforcement has taken the form of violations far more massive than any violations by North Vietnam. Our jet air forces and bases, our helicopter fleet, the 23,000 U.S. military advisers are all violations of the 1954 accord. So are they violations of section after section of the United Nations Charter, under which we are pledged to seek peaceful solutions to disputes and to lay before the U.N. those disputes we are unable to solve peacefully through means of our own choosing. We have done neither in Vietnam.

A negotiated settlement in South Vietnam is the first solution we are obliged to seek. Of course, it would mean some guaranteed neutralization of the country. That would give its war-torn people the best chance they have yet had to construct a country of their own, something the French, the Japanese, the French again, and now the Americans have not given them.

If we fail to reach a negotiated settlement, then the U.N. Charter requires the dispute to be laid before a regional organization, such as SEATO, or one of the U.N. bodies. Both groups have the capacity to police the country; both the more likely to bring it some degree of cohesion than is the United States with its unilateral intervention in pursuit of our own interests.

Some Americans have busily erected an enormous pyramid of disasters they contend would result even from this limited American retrenchment. They see America as a power in the Pacific only if we and our friends control all its shores instead of just its northern, eastern, and southern shores, plus the island fringe off its western shore. Most important, they ignore the impossibility of creating an American foothold on that shore in mid-20th century, communism or no communism.

Many countries, East and West, have accommodated themselves to the end of the old order in Asia. We will, too, eventually. The only question is how much blood and money we will waste first trying to turn the clock back.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times Magazine, Jan. 17, 1965]

WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM
(By Henry Cabot Lodge)

"Pulling out of Vietnam" is exactly the same as "turning Vietnam over to the Communists." Such a course would not be merely imprudent, but actually extremely dangerous.

Geographically, Vietnam stands at the hub of a vast area of the world—southeast Asia—an area with a population of 240 million people extending 2,300 miles from north to south, and 3,000 miles from east to west. The Mekong River, one of the 10 largest rivers in the world, reaches the sea in South Vietnam. He who holds or has influence in Vietnam can affect the future of the Philippines and Taiwan to the east, Thailand and Burma with their huge rice surpluses to the west, and Malaysia and Indonesia with their rubber, oil, and tin to the south. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand would in turn be deeply concerned by the communization of South Vietnam.

Historically, Vietnam has long played a part in the political development of the Far East. For many centuries it was under the occupation or influence of the Chinese and was used by the Chinese as a means of enforcing their hegemony over the whole of southeast Asia. The Vietnamese did not en-

joy this experience and have traditionally done what they could to throw off Chinese overlordship. In a very real sense, therefore, the present struggle is one of self-determination.

But today Vietnam should be seen as one more instance in a long series of events which began in Iran, Turkey, and Greece after World War II; which include the seizure of Czechoslovakia; which led to the Marshall plan in Europe; which caused the Korean war, the Malayan emergency, the Huks rebellion in the Philippines, and the Berlin crisis. In all these widely separated places the Communist bloc has tried to subvert and to undermine the free world in order to spread its control and its suppression of freedom.

In opposing this Communist onslaught, the free world has stood together for nearly two decades. One manifestation of our common determination to frustrate the Communist design to conquer Europe was the creation of NATO. Elsewhere in the world we have formed other alliances. The United States alone has suffered 160,000 casualties since the end of World War II in this effort to contain the spread of communism.

This worldwide effort by nations of the free world has not been undertaken out of a simple quixotic delight in engaging in battles in distant places. Nor does it signify a desire to establish a new colonialism or any kind of special position. The war in Vietnam is not only the struggle of a small nation to exist, but it is also an open encounter between the doctrine that "wars of revolution," as the Communists call them, are the wave of the future, and our belief that in the future nations should be allowed to develop their own destinies free from outside interference.

Although the North Vietnamese have their own motives for their aggression in South Vietnam and have played the leading role, they have always been backed by the Chinese Communists. Should their aggression be successful, the Chinese Communists will have seen positive proof that their approach to international relations is correct.

Such an outcome might well lead the Soviets, in their desire to retain the leadership of the Communist bloc, to adopt a more belligerent stance in their relations with the outside world. This would surely affect the West.

It would also be regarded everywhere as a reflection of the inability or lack of will of the free world to prevent aggression. What, for example, would be the reaction in Europe if the United States were to withdraw from southeast Asia in the face of the commitment to assist the nations there?

The state of public opinion in the United States itself would also be affected. Should Vietnam be lost, many voices would be heard urging us in effect to "resign from the world," fall back onto our "fortress America" and gird up our loins for a contest with guided missiles. This too would be something which neither Europe nor the rest of the free world could ignore.

Because of all these considerations, the United States has undertaken to support the Vietnamese both politically and militarily, in an effort which has cost us lives and treasure. The effort has not been in vain.

Although we are not yet victorious, we have achieved a stalemate, which is surely much better than defeat. On the economic and social front the United States has contributed to the building of schools, clinics, and better farms, all of which are essential to gaining and holding the political support that must be had to win the war. And we try to help in every way in training civil administrators and in creating political energy in the country.

Some have said that despite this effort the war in Vietnam cannot be won. Yet recent history shows that we have been fighting

wars of this sort for the past 20 years and that the record is creditable. We of the free world won in Greece, we thwarted the Communist aggression in Korea, we won in Malaya, we won in the Philippines, and we can win in Vietnam. We must persist and we must not play into the enemy's hands by counting on a quick, sensational, and easy way out and then being disappointed when it does not occur.

Persistent execution of the political and military plans which have been agreed to will bring victory—provided outside pressures do not become too great. These outside pressures occur in many forms such as the problem of sanctuaries from which Vietnam can be attacked and the Vietcong helped with impunity. Infiltration from such sanctuaries cannot be allowed to defeat the efforts the Vietnamese are making. We will not shrink from taking such measures as seem necessary to cope with it.

Another form of "outside pressure" is the desire in some quarters for an international conference here and now. We do not oppose the idea of holding international conferences as an abstract proposition—if they are held at the proper time and under the proper circumstances—but we think that to hold a conference now would serve no good purpose and would seriously undermine morale in South Vietnam. Consider the reasons:

1. There have already been two conferences on southeast Asia (one on Vietnam and another on Laos), the terms of which were satisfactory but which the Communists violated before the ink was dry. Before holding another conference there must be some sign that the Communists of Hanoi and Peking are prepared to let their southern neighbors alone.

2. For the South Vietnamese to go to a conference now with a large and aggressive fifth column on their soil would amount to a surrender. A conference not preceded by a verifiable Communist decision to cease attacking and subverting South Vietnam would be nothing more than a capitulation.

3. There is clearly no agreement between us and the Communists on the simple proposition to let South Vietnam alone. A conference held in an atmosphere of bitter disagreement could only make matters more dangerous than they already are.

So-called neutrality is another outside pressure standing in the way of the successful prosecution of the war in South Vietnam. Neutralism that does not include some means of enforcement, that does not include North Vietnam, that means South Vietnam will be alone and disarmed, is nothing more than surrender. It should be opposed for Vietnam just as it is opposed for Berlin or for Germany. It takes strength to be neutral. South Vietnam is not strong enough today to be neutral.

In truth both Vietnams are "neutralized" now by article 10 of the Geneva accord of July 21, 1954, which said: "the two parties shall insure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

This provision was formally approved by article 5 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954, which the U.S.S.R., Red China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam attended.

We must therefore insist before there is any discussion of a conference or of neutralism, that the Communists stop their aggression and live up to the agreements which already exist. The minute the onslaught ceases, there can be peace. At present, the North Vietnamese seem only to understand force, and, of course, when they use force they must be met with force, as they were in the Gulf of Tonkin. They should also be

met with the strong and united opposition of the free world.

It seems that conflicts in far-off places are precisely those which have often brought war and calamity to all of us. Manchuria seemed far away in 1931; the subversion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler seemed remote to the United States in 1938. Persistence, and unity in the face of Communist pressure have succeeded in Europe and in southeast Asia, and can succeed again.

Mao Tse-tung said: "Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed."

The struggle in Vietnam is not a "war" in the sense that World War II—or Korea—was a "war," because total military success in Vietnam, unaccompanied by success in other fields, will not bring victory. A many-sided effort is needed; no single effort will solve the problem; the problem is thus the despair of the headline writer and the political stump speaker employing black-and-white phraseology.

Therefore, those who say that there is a quick solution or a simple solution or an exclusively military solution are doing as much of a disservice as are those who say that there is no hope, that we must pull out and that another southeast Asian conference (added to the two which have been already held—and dishonored) will do other than turn South Vietnam over to the Communists.

They also do a disservice who deny that much has been achieved, that the military program, the economic program, the social program, the informational program, and the various technical programs have all accomplished much—have indeed built the springboard of victory—and that it is the political, countersubversive, counterterrorist program which still needs special attention.

It is accurate to say that a glass is half full of water and it is also accurate to say that the glass is half empty. To dwell on the fact that we have not achieved victory does not negate the other fact that we have prevented defeat—and that a stalemate is much better than a defeat.

It is not the American tradition to get panicky whenever there is a little rough weather. If we decide only to interest ourselves in the nice, quiet, neat countries (which do not need our help) and abandon all the rough, tough, difficult places to the Communists, we will soon find ourselves surrounded by a rough, tough world which is aimed straight at the destruction of the United States and which will make our present effort in Vietnam seem like the mildest of pink teas.

EXHIBIT 3

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Jan. 18, 1965]

FOUR STUDENTS SHOT IN VIETNAM AS RIOTING SWEETS TWO CITIES—2,000 AT HUE DEMAND OUSTER OF HUONG AFTER OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE IN DALAT—TROOPS EVADE VIETCONG TRAP

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, January 17.—Anti-Government demonstrations by student and Buddhist groups swept the central Vietnamese cities of Hue and Dalat today. Four students were shot and wounded.

The rioting occurred as the Government reported two new clashes with Communist guerrillas. In one battle, a Government unit outwitted the Vietcong and inflicted heavy casualties as they were preparing an ambush.

At Hue, the ancient imperial capital near the North Vietnamese border, 2,000 students, including some Buddhists, massed outside the radio studio and shouted demands for the dismissal of Premier Tran Van Huong.

They were angered by reports that the four students wounded in Dalat had died. Actually the students were being treated at a private clinic and the nature of their wounds was not disclosed.

In the Dalat demonstration, 500 students paraded through the streets, forcing shops to close. Policemen and troops set up barricades to keep order, but the preventive measures shortened tempers and rocks were thrown.

A U.S. Embassy source said there were reports that a Vietnamese national policeman in civilian clothes had fired the shots.

The demonstrators were reported to include students from two Government-run high schools—the Hung Dao School for boys and the Bui Thi Xuan School for girls—and from a Buddhist school.

In the fighting at Tayninh, near the Cambodian border, meanwhile, Government forces killed 25 Communist rebels after discovering a Communist ambush plot.

Instead of breaking through the rebels' roadblock, the Government troops halted and called for reinforcements to steal behind the Vietcong troops lining the road.

Two Government soldiers were killed and one was wounded. A number of Vietcong weapons were seized, including 11 rifles, 2 pistols, 2 carbines, and a radio.

In other action, Government troops using 105-mm. artillery fire, supported by Vietnamese Air Force strikes, drove off two Vietcong companies 10 miles south of Binh Gia.

U.S. military spokesmen said two Government outposts had withstood the Vietcong assault despite casualties totaling 10 killed and 15 wounded. The artillery fire and the air strikes finally drove off the Communist forces, the spokesman said.

EXHIBIT 4

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Jan. 19, 1965]

THIRTY PERCENT OF VIETNAM DRAFTEES DESERT WITHIN 6 WEEKS

(By Jack Langruth)

PHU BAI, SOUTH VIETNAM, January 18.—Tran Niem, a 28-year-old potato farmer, was recently drafted into the South Vietnamese Army, and he does not like it.

"There has not been enough food for the past 3 weeks," the new private said.

Although the winds were raw on the rifle range, he was firing in his bare feet. He had never worn shoes before his induction and the boots the army issued to him had left bleeding blisters on his heels and toes.

Thirty percent of the draftees inducted with Private Niem 6 weeks ago like the army even less than he. They have already deserted.

That percentage is standard for the Dong Da National Training Center at Phu Bai, near Hue in central Vietnam. Some recruits leave to attend to family problems, then return to camp. There is no organized attempt to pursue and punish the men who do not come back.

TRAINING IS VERY HARD

Another private, Hoang Ton, the father of two children, said he was looking forward to leaving the army as quickly as possible.

Private Niem's thin face was alert and mobile as he gave his reasons for wanting to return to his nearby village. Private Ton's expression was sullen. "All of the training," he said through an interpreter, "is very hard for me."

Unless he also deserts, Private Ton's return to civilian life is far off. Both volunteers and draftees are usually held in the regular army for the duration. In some instances, men have been released after 3 years of service, but a new soldier cannot count on it.

During his service a soldier's pay is adequate. A private receives 1,600 plasters, almost \$18 a month. Woodcutters in this province earn a quarter of that.

The training that perplexes Private Ton is based on U.S. Army manuals. It is divided into a 5-week basic course and a 4-week period of advanced combat training. An added 3 weeks of training, which had been

trimmed to speed the output of recruits, will soon be restored.

The most time for any one aspect of military training, 50 hours, is given to teaching the new soldier to use a carbine. Eight hours is devoted to teaching him to use the heavier M-1 rifle.

Only 12 hours in the first 5 weeks are given over to political indoctrination.

Complaints about the food here go beyond the griping traditionally done by soldiers. The floods south of Hue have made transportation of supplies difficult and student protest demonstrations have kept many stores closed.

Lt. Col. Tran Heuu Tu, who commands the Dong Da center, is allotted 15 plasters a day, about 12 cents, to feed each trainee.

COOKING SOMETIMES EARLY

Rice and meat strips are cooked in outdoor vats. The food is then set out on plank tables hours ahead of time, sometimes with plastic sheets stretched across the plates to keep flies off. Soup is heated and served in scrub buckets.

Australian and American advisers at the camp do not interfere. "We're not here to lecture them on sanitation or anything else," one adviser said. "We save our nudging for those areas of tactics where we might be able to contribute something."

Dong Da is responsible for guarding Hue Airport ammunition dumps and a classified American radio-research unit in the area. Regular reconnaissance companies, back at the center for refresher training, handle most of the night patrols.

Although the hilly countryside is dotted with Communist-led Vietcong bands, the patrolling is generally uneventful. When the Communist guerrillas have ventured out in any numbers, Government troops, with an assist from the trainees, have driven them back and inflicted heavy casualties.

Despite these successes, the practice has been for Government patrols to huddle together at dusk and move only during daylight hours when Vietcong activity was limited.

After forceful objections by the Australian advisers, Colonel Tu this week changed the procedure. He ordered his men to travel at night in eight-man patrols.

The new method has not yet been perfected. On the first small patrol the Vietnamese troops set out with live geese and chicken slung over their shoulders.

While Western advisers deplore a prevailing lack of aggressiveness they have found that with proper leadership the Vietnamese make good soldiers.

"And when leadership fails," one Australian officer said, "You hear some lovely stories about our men picking up a few Vietnamese by the scruff of the neck and saying 'You're coming with me!'"

EXHIBIT 5

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 18, 1965]

DELAY OR DIPLOMACY IN VIETNAM?

Is U.S. military and diplomatic policy in South Vietnam the haphazard, improvisatory, Micawberish affair that it may seem when viewed from one angle? Is Washington—as well as Saigon—merely waiting for "something to turn up," which could point out a new path through the jungle of American troubles in southeast Asia?

Or are recent American actions—specifically the heavy bombing raid against the bridge at Ban Ban in Communist North Vietnam and the presence of atomic weapon-bearing Polaris submarines in Asian waters—part of a well-thought-out and complex diplomatic maneuver?

We get no hint of an answer from Washington. This silence would be expected if Washington is conducting a delicate diplomatic maneuver. It would also be expected

if, unhappily, Washington did not know in which way to move or what policy to follow. Three choices seem to lie before Washington in South Vietnam today: (a) to keep on helping South Vietnam fight to the bitter end, with a constant stepping up of American military action, (b) a negotiated peace with the Communist North, and (c) to abandon the entire effort as quickly and as decisively as possible.

Each of these courses is difficult. The first is the one which has been tried, but which does not seem to be succeeding. The third would cause a disastrous decline in American prestige in the area, and would raise grave doubts all over the world as to Washington's determination to live up to its many commitments.

The middle course is the one which appears to be receiving a wider and wider hearing in Washington. Yet, if the present American policy is veering toward negotiation, why the stepping up of the military effort? May it not be with the intention of sitting down at the conference table in as strong a position as an otherwise disastrous situation will permit?

If such is the case, it is understandable why Washington must refuse to answer the evermore insistent questions of those who demand to be told what the United States plans to do about southeast Asia. If the United States is seeking to build a strong bargaining position, through an increased demonstration of military might, it cannot be expected to weaken that position by talking about it.

Perhaps Washington is not following such a delictae diplomatic maneuver. Perhaps it is merely groping and hoping. Perhaps it is prepared to step up its military intervention to the point where it believes that North Vietnam can be made to reconsider the cost of its growing intervention in the Communist rebellion in the south. We do not know. But it is doubtful if, with the war going as badly as it has in recent months, the answer can be long delayed.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, and after discussing the matter with the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN], I announce that there will be no business transacted on tomorrow, Inauguration Day. The Senate will move in a body, shortly after convening, to the Inauguration.

It is our intention after the prayer to suggest the absence of a quorum, and, at approximately 10:45, or thereabouts, adjournment will take place.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT FROM WEDNESDAY TO FRIDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that when the Senate adjourns tomorrow, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Friday next.

The motion was agreed to.

THE VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLOSING OF LINCOLN HOSPITAL PROTESTED

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the Veterans' Administration has determined that several VA hospitals should be closed. The hospital at Lincoln, Nebr., is included among those to be eliminated.

Many of us in the Senate and in particular on the Appropriations Committee have a great appreciation for the importance of eliminating unnecessary spending. There are, however, other considerations in spending the taxpayer's money. One of these is the defense of our country, past as well as future. We have a continuing obligation and duty to provide adequate and necessary care for our veterans. When any doubts arise concerning the economy of cutting back on those who have given of their health and their lives, these doubts must be resolved in favor of providing adequate medical care for our ex-service men.

This obligation is not met by shipping veterans off to our overcrowded and distant urban centers to spend their more difficult days. It is not met by removing them from their homes, the places they have chosen to return after defending their country. It is not met by sending them somewhere because others have chosen to go there or, in some cases, can afford to go there.

Our veterans are human beings, not units or numbers to fill beds. We must see that they are treated as human beings who have come to the defense of their country when it needed them the most. The national conscience can allow no less.

The distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], has pointed out the losses suffered by the State of Montana in defense installations and now in defense obligations. Lincoln, Nebr., has suffered a similar fate. It and Miles City, Mont., are the only cities to be hit by both the closing of a veterans hospital and an Air Force base, all within a few weeks. We hear much talk about the computers which make these decisions, but are computers really coordinating all the factors which must be considered? If so, their communications have broken down.

When the Lincoln Air Force Base was closed, an economic development expert was sent by the Department of Defense to help Lincoln overcome the impact of the cutback. While he was busily giving advice, the hospital closing was announced. I am told that he had to call back in disbelief to the Veterans' Administration to confirm the announcement. Just as the Administration neglected to inform Members of Congress, it apparently failed to inform the Department of Defense.

The president of the Lincoln Chamber of Commerce, Thomas Pansing, said that a team sent out by the Federal Government to soften the blow of the air-base closing told him:

The Federal Government would do everything possible to ease the impact of the

closing. So far the only help we've received from the Federal Government is to close the veterans hospital.

Mr. Pansing summed up the feeling of many Nebraskans when he said: We can't afford too much more help like this.

My fellow Nebraskans and I know that our economy can withstand these closings. It will set us back but we will survive. The Federal Government may well find another activity to conduct in Lincoln. But that is not the question. The question is: Will this provide the care needed by our veterans?

I am gratified that the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee will study this question. I ask unanimous consent that a letter sent to the chairman of that subcommittee, Senator YARBOROUGH, requesting that such a study be conducted be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, when the Veterans' Administration briefed members of the Nebraska delegation on this action, we were not satisfied that the closing of the Lincoln Hospital was fully justified. Additional information has been requested from the VA on the future medical needs of veterans in the region served by the Lincoln facilities. It is my hope that the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee will examine this factor in studying the decision.

Let it be clear that this decision to close these facilities is the decision of the Veterans' Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, and through the Bureau the ultimate decision rests with the Johnson administration. The sole elected official participating in this decision is the President.

As Members of the Senate, we did not receive notice that these closings were under consideration until the decision had been made. Within a few days after I was notified of the decision, an announcement was made that no more patients would be admitted to the Lincoln Hospital. It is my hope, therefore, that the Veterans' Administration will take notice of the congressional hearings and reverse its policy of refusing admission to patients.

I am gratified at the announcement that hearings are scheduled on the subject of the closing of all Veterans' Administration hospitals, and I earnestly commend to the subcommittee the merits and facts which pertain to the proposed closing of the hospital in Lincoln, Nebr.

EXHIBIT 1

JANUARY 18, 1965.

HON. RALPH YARBOROUGH,
Chairman, Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee,
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
U.S. Senate

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Announced closing of the Lincoln Veterans Hospital was received with sharp sense of loss and disappointment in Nebraska, as undoubtedly was the case as to the other facilities similarly treated.

No one that we know of would be against cuts of clearly demonstrated unnecessary spending; but in every case, due regard

should be accorded the objectives of the program at issue. This is especially true of the national commitment made to our veterans, and the firm obligations flowing therefrom. If any doubts appear in the balancing of these factors, they must be resolved in favor of the medical care which our servicemen have earned and to which they are entitled.

It is strongly felt, as I am certain the consensus shows, that the Veterans' Administration should be put on very strict proof as to the humane, moral, and overall wisdom of the course it proposes.

To that end, I join with those of our colleagues who have already called upon you as chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee to make a thorough study and inquiry into all these closings, and that the situation in Lincoln and in Nebraska be given a searching scrutiny with them.

At one upon receipt of the Veterans' Administrations announcement, my colleague Senator Curtis and I held a conference in my office with Dr. Linus Zink who was courteously requested to be present by Mr. Driver, Administrator of the Veterans' Administration. He furnished us some information on which the Veterans' Administration decision was based. Frankly, at the close of the meeting, neither my colleague nor I were satisfied that a case had been made out to justify the announced action.

Dr. Zink agreed to transmit to us additional information which will be sent to you for the subcommittee records and consideration upon its arrival. Communications and protests from Nebraskans—veterans, patients, employees, and others—have come to me. They are being sent to you for the record also.

It is hoped that arrangements for hearings will be made and announced soon, and vigorously pressed.

Sincerely yours,

ROMAN L. HRUSKA,
U.S. Senator, Nebraska.

"COMMUNITY SERVICE—WE BUILD," KIWANIS THEME FOR 1965

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, Kiwanis International has adopted for its administrative theme for 1965, "Community Service—We Build."

An impressive presentation of the theme, the objectives and committee emphases for this year is being made this month at local Kiwanis clubs throughout the Nation.

Mr. Robert Hasebroock, member of Downtown Kiwanis Club of Omaha, Nebr., has sent me a copy of the presentation "as an outstanding example of what freemen, through voluntary action, can and will do without government assistance."

The Kiwanis program is characterized in this quotation from the presentation of its 1965 theme:

There can be no building by freemen unless men are free. If we are to assume the continuity of Kiwanis service, we must assume the continuity of a society in which men are free to work toward goals which they themselves have chosen. Service clubs have no reason for existence, even if permitted to exist, in a society where all services are provided by the state; service clubs would have no sustaining force in a society where the state denies the existence of a Supreme Being.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the theme presentation printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the theme presentation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMUNITY SERVICE—WE BUILD

They dreamed a dream.

In an age obsessed with the material, they dreamed that man could give primacy to the spiritual. Though nation was rising against nation, they dreamed that man could do to others what he would want others to do to him. They dreamed that, in the heart of man, apathy could be supplanted by awareness—that indifference could be transformed into concern, and self-concern into self-giving.

Fifty years ago—they dreamed a dream.

The merchant, the teacher—the farmer, the banker—men of all callings—joined in that dream, having faith in the ideal that men working together in community service might change the world.

Through the golden anniversary of Kiwanis International, we acknowledge our debt to those men of vision, and our awareness of the golden legacy which they created, nurtured, and now lay at our feet for us to protect, enrich, and bring to fruition. No other group of men has received a richer heritage than we.

But dreams can pass into nothingness, and fade away like morning dew. Each age must dream anew. "Each age is a dream that is dying or one that is coming to birth." With gratitude, we glance behind us; with a sense of destiny, we strive ahead, looking to the stars and hearing God's promise to Isaiah: "For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth."

Change and permanence are the only certainties in our future. Change will bring about its own enchanting miracles—new opportunities to serve, new resources to use, new dreams to dream. No seer can yet set down the course of man in the next century or the next decade. But as change is certain, so too is permanence. The star that led the camel caravan in the days of the Pharaoh guides the astronaut in his orbit. The principles which have endured through the past 50 years of Kiwanis history will endure permanently, guiding us as surely as the Pole Star in determining the course we shall pursue. Man can change and produce change, but man cannot alter the eternal.

Let us then resolve to focus our sights on the principles which have characterized our 50 years of service: faith in God, the dignity and freedom of the individual, citizenship responsibility, patriotism, and good will. Let us resolve that as community service has been the dominant philosophy under which Kiwanians have served for 50 years, community service will be the dominant philosophy of Kiwanis for the next 50 years. Whatever changes may occur in our manner of life or fortunes, whatever changes may occur in our organizational structure or our immediate objectives, community service can be the permanent characteristic of Kiwanis history.

The past, then, is our introduction to a continuing drama. As we enter this golden anniversary year, we draw the curtain for act 2, playing our roles according to the scenario provided by our forebears. Reflecting our rededication to the spirit of Kiwanis—past, the renewal of our vows to Kiwanis—present, and the affirmation of our faith in Kiwanis—future, our administrative theme for 1965 is "Community Service—We Build."

The golden anniversary year provides no occasion for marking time while we celebrate the past. The need and the opportunities for Kiwanis service were never greater. The 1965 theme of "Community Service—We Build" not only provides the continuity for the mainstream of Kiwanis history; it chal-

lenges us to complete the unfinished work at hand. Stated in another way, the theme says: "Through services to our communities, we will build a better world in 1965."

But where shall we build, and what shall we build? What are our objectives for 1965?

There can be no building by freemen unless men are free. If we are to assume the continuity of Kiwanis service, we must assure the continuity of a society in which men are free to work toward goals which they themselves have chosen. Service clubs have no reason for existence, even if permitted to exist, in a society where all services are provided by the state; service clubs would have no sustaining force in a society where the state denies the existence of a Supreme Being. If the time should ever come when we look upon man and see him as no more than a well-fed, well-housed organism in a godless world, a statistic without individual freedom or dignity, then we can be certain that the service club movement is ancient history. Our whole existence depends upon the freedom of the individual to act independently and to serve his Creator according to the tenets of his faith, whatever that faith may be, so the first objective for 1965 is that we build, defend, and preserve our heritage of freedom, our belief in God, and the dignity of man in his human and spiritual relationships.

Two thousand years ago, it was recorded that a voice from Heaven spoke to shepherds tending their flocks and said: "Glory to God in the highest, and peace on earth to men of good will." Whatever our religious faith may be, none can deny that good will is essential for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of bonds among the free nations of the world. Even among nations which would be friendly, the seeds of distrust, of envy, and of fear are always present; this is a fact of life. But distrust, envy, and fear can be germinated by ignorance and nurtured by misunderstanding. It is possible, as the people of Canada and the United States have so dramatically demonstrated, for men of different nations to do to others what they would want others to do to them, yet this would not be possible without understanding. We know too little about our brothers in the other nations of the free world; we must work purposefully in 1965 to bring about maximum contacts, maximum communication, and, in turn, maximum understanding. Our second objective for 1965 is that we build international understanding by demonstrating the basic principle of the Golden Rule, using as an example Canada—United States good will.

It is idle to speak of freedom without believing in economic freedom. Part of the heritage of freedom is that man has the right to own property, to operate a business, to pursue a profession of his choice, and to save, spend, or invest his earnings as he chooses. This economic system has brought us strength; it has brought us prosperity; it has made independence possible. It must be preserved from all substitutes and defended against all who would weaken it. We cannot well defend or preserve what we take for granted, what we do not understand. It is imperative that we ourselves and the youth of our nations understand the fundamental principles of a free economy. Therefore, our third objective for 1965 is that we build an understanding of and appreciation for the private ownership of property by educating ourselves and our youth in the principles of a free capitalistic system.

Government at any level takes on the character of those who govern. Where our leaders are weak, our government will be weak; where strong, our government will be strong. Patronage does not insure performance; integrity is not a necessary product of popularity. Character and competence are the hallmarks of responsible leaders. Kiwanis

whether you will propose that this veto be exercised to protect our balance of payments. Sincerely yours,

WAYNE MORSE.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I particularly call attention to Mr. Dillon's words:

Any application by the Bank for bond sales in our market will be reviewed on its merits in the light of the concrete situation at the time—including our own balance of payments and the effect of any Bank borrowing thereon.

Yet at the end of December the World Bank announced that it will float a \$200 million bond issue in the United States beginning on January 18, an announcement that coincided with the news that the U.S. balance-of-payment deficit had reached record proportions and required a special message from the President to the Congress regarding steps to curb it.

I trust that this special message will report the reasons for permitting this World Bank bond issue to proceed at the very time when it would have the worst possible impact upon our balance of payments.

Finally, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point a letter I have addressed to the Secretary on January 8 concerning this matter.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 8, 1965.

Hon. C. DOUGLAS DILLON,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to recall my letter to you of October 18, 1964, in which I expressed concern over the prospect that the World Bank would seek to raise new capital in the U.S. market. In your response of October 27 you stated that the United States should not at present prohibit "any and all attempts by the Bank to mobilize private funds for development through bond sales to U.S. residents." There nevertheless was at least an implication that the bulk of the \$300 to \$400 million of new capital required by the World Bank might be raised outside this country. According to the New York Times of December 29, however, the World Bank has now announced it will float a \$200 million bond issue in the United States beginning on January 18.

It seems to me that the key sentence in your October 27 letter was the following: "Any application by the Bank for bond sales in our market will be reviewed on its merits in the light of the concrete situation at the time—including our own balance of payments and the effect of any Bank borrowing thereon." Frankly, I am not aware of any measurable improvement in our balance-of-payments situation during the past 2 months; indeed, I would assume the contrary from the New York Times story of December 30, 1964, by Richard E. Mooney—a copy of which is attached. The article reports that the OECD annual review of the U.S. economy contains the advice "that more curbs on outflowing capital may be needed to put the country's international payments in better balance." Yet the proposed World Bank bond issue appears a dramatic move in the opposite direction.

In these circumstances, I would like very much to know just what sort of review of the Bank application took place within the U.S. Government. Specifically, was approval of the application given by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, and was the

decision taken unanimously? How do you assess the impact on our balance of payments in concrete terms?

In short, I would appreciate learning the full story of this transaction and its implications; you need not be concerned about sparing me any details.

Sincerely yours,

WAYNE MORSE.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to the Senator from Missouri [MR. SYMINGTON], who has performed yeoman service for the Senate in his constantly challenging the administration's policies in regard to the balance-of-payments problem.

Most respectfully I say to my President, "You had better take a long, hard look at the record of your Treasury Department in this field before you send up any special message on the subject, because you are going to be confronted with a long series of questions here in the Senate in regard to the policies that have been followed by the Secretary of the Treasury, which, in my judgment, are unfortunate policies, to say the least."

VN

U.S. ACTION IN LAOS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I see no other Senator who wishes to speak during the morning hour. I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 3 minutes on another subject.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a UPI article appearing in this morning's New York Times entitled "U.S. Terms Raids in Laos Justified by Red Violations."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. TERMS RAIDS IN LAOS JUSTIFIED BY RED VIOLATIONS—SAYS COMMUNISTS DISREGARD GENEVA ACCORDS—STRIKES TO CONTINUE IF NEEDED

WASHINGTON, January 18.—The Johnson administration contended today that U.S. military actions in Laos, such as the air strike last Wednesday against a bridge, were justified by Communist violations of the 1962 Geneva accords establishing Laotian independence and neutrality.

It also made clear that it intended to continue using U.S. military force, if necessary, to maintain Laos against Communist incursions.

The administration's position was made known in two forms—a Presidential defense message to Congress and a statement issued by the State Department.

ASIAN PROGRAM UNCHANGED

In his defense message, the President reaffirmed that "our program remains unchanged" in southeast Asia. He said the United States would continue to give military and economic assistance to nations such as Laos and South Vietnam, which are "struggling against covert aggression in the form of externally directed, undeclared guerrilla warfare."

In Laos, he went on, the United States has demonstrated since 1950 its commitment to freedom, independence, and neutrality by "strengthening the economic and military security of that nation."

"We shall continue to support the legitimate Government of that country," he declared.

The President stressed that "the problem of Laos is the refusal of the Communist

forces to honor the Geneva accords in which they entered in 1962."

The State Department also said that the American military actions in Laos were "entirely justified" by the repeated Communist violations of the 1962 accords.

POSITION QUESTIONED

Whether the United States still felt bound by the 1962 accords was questioned after it was disclosed that Americans had conducted bombing missions against key points in the supply routes used by the Communists from North Vietnam into Laos. Reconnaissance missions were acknowledged earlier.

Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, charged last weekend that such attack and reconnaissance missions represented a U.S. violation of a provision of the 1962 accords. This prohibits the introduction of foreign military troops in Laos.

When the question was raised last Friday, it was met by silence at the State Department.

Today, however, the Department was prepared with a statement providing a justification for the air missions. At the same time it still refused to confirm that the United States had been conducting bombing missions against Communist targets in Laos.

The statement, given by the Department Press Officer, Robert J. McCloskey, said:

"We continue to support the Geneva agreements and the independence and neutrality of Laos which they are intended to achieve."

Mr. McCloskey declined to say whether U.S. assistance included the air strike Wednesday by a squadron of U.S. fighter-bombers against a strategic bridge near Ban Ban in central Laos.

Mr. McCloskey did say that any "assistance" had been given at the request of Prince Souvannah Phouma, the Laotian Premier.

The Prince is understood to have demanded that there be no announcement about the missions.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to quote a paragraph or two of that article:

The Johnson administration contended today that U.S. military actions in Laos, such as the air strike last Wednesday against a bridge, were justified by Communist violations of the 1962 Geneva accords establishing Laotian independence and neutrality.

It also made clear that it intends to continue using U.S. military force, if necessary, to maintain Laos against Communist incursions.

That statement is shocking. Mr. President, I say there is no question about the fact that the U.S. military has conducted these raids. There is no justification on the part of my party's administration for concealing from the American people this fact and no justification for not issuing a formal official statement that the United States is making war in Laos and killing American boys in that war.

Mr. President, I am shocked that such a policy is being followed by the State Department and the Pentagon, and that we let the American people learn of our warmaking activities in southeast Asia through war correspondents. Then our State Department and our Pentagon attack those war correspondents. I happen to be one who defends these war correspondents, because time and time again they have demonstrated that they will not follow the propaganda line of the State Department and the Pentagon, for if they followed that line, they would be nought but kept journalists on the war front.

Mr. President, we are greatly indebted to the fact that at least our war cor-

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respondents abroad insist upon putting into practice the precious constitutional meaning of freedom of the press. But the article to which I have referred is very interesting. It states further:

Whether the United States still felt bound by 1962 accords was questioned after it was disclosed that Americans had conducted bombing missions against key points in the supply routes used by the Communists from North Vietnam into Laos.

Mr. President, Britain, France, Russia, and China are some of the other countries that signed the treaty along with the United States.

The treaty set up an International Control Commission composed of India, Poland and Canada, to investigate any violations of the treaty and of the cease-fire between the rival Laotian factions.

The London Observer reports that in the British view of the treaty, it is up to this Commission to investigate whether there has been any breach of the treaty. It is true that the American bombing raid took place in territory controlled by the Pathet Lao. Whether the Pathet Lao would permit the Commission to investigate U.S. complaints of violations is doubted by American authorities, hence the resort to force of arms.

Mr. President, my opposition to war-making policies of the United States in Laos is the same as my opposition to the unjustifiable killing of American boys in South Vietnam in a warmaking policy of our Government there.

What we ought to do is live up to our obligations and call upon our allies to live up to their obligations under the United Nations treaty. Great Britain, Canada, France, and the other signatories to the United Nations Charter, including the United States, ought to be calling upon the United Nations to make a report to the world in regard to the violations of the Laotian treaty by North Vietnam, Red China, and possibly others. But, in my judgment, there is no hope of avoiding a massive war in Asia in the very near future if the United States continues to take this present attitude—an attitude which was expressed by the American Ambassador in the United Nations not so many weeks ago in that unfortunate speech he delivered before the Security Council, in which he said, in effect, that the United States intends to do what it thinks needs to be done in southeast Asia, and the rest of the world can take it and like it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (MR. MORNENY in the chair). The time of the Senator from Oregon has expired.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 more minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from Oregon is recognized for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to say to our Ambassador to the United Nations and to the President of the United States that they are skating on thin ice. The danger is that we are going to see an outbreak of a massive war in Asia because of the unilateral action of the United States in making war in South Vietnam, in clear violation of the United

Nations Charter, in violation of the Geneva accords of 1954, and in violation of our long standing, professed ideals that we are a nation that believes in substituting the rule of law for the jungle law of military might.

We are now practicing an application of the jungle law of military might as a substitute for our ideals. So long as there is any hope of avoiding that war and helping to bring my country back inside the framework of international law and laying this whole threat to the peace of the world before the United Nations, the voice of the senior Senator from Oregon will be raised in that cause.

I believe the time is long overdue when the President of the United States should proceed to make clear to the world that the United States stands ready for a review by the United Nations of the whole threat to the peace of the world. The issue of the Congo will be coming up. I hope that the United Nations will go back into the Congo. Yet there are forces in the United States that would have the United States go into the Congo on a unilateral basis and allow the killing of American boys there in carrying out a unilateral American military policy. I pray that before it is too late, we will try to put on the spot, so to speak, our alleged allies in the United Nations—Great Britain, France, Canada, Italy, and all the rest—who claim that they believe in the substitution of peaceful procedures for military force. Let us ask them: "Are you willing to stand with us in trying to work out an honorable peace that will not result in carrying out all the fears that are being expressed by increasing hundreds of thousands of sincere, patriotic Americans, who are raising the question: 'How much longer are we going to carry out a unilateral course of action and killing American boys in South Vietnam, when we have not yet exhausted peaceful procedures for the settlement of the dispute through the United Nations?'"

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the close of these remarks an editorial from the Wall Street Journal of today entitled "If Vietnam Falls."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IF VIETNAM FALLS

If the United States is forced out of Vietnam one way or another, what does it then do about the rest of southeast Asia?

The question may never have to be answered, and the U.S. Government undoubtedly hopes it won't have to be. Conceivably, in some fashion totally unclear at present, the Communist Vietcong attacks can be halted and stability at last restored in Saigon.

But since no one is putting many odds on that possibility, it is essential to consider the implications of failure and withdrawal. Though the United States has no known intention of suddenly up and leaving—its public statements emphasize just the opposite—it could be compelled to abandon the effort for at least a couple of imaginable reasons.

One might be a military determination that the war is unwinable even in the limited sense of getting the Reds out of South Vietnam; certainly there is nothing to indicate we are making headway after these lengthening years of costly struggle. Another reason might be that the Vietnamese would in effect ask the United States to leave,

either through their leaders of the moment or through an evident unwillingness of the people to go on fighting.

The South Vietnamese in general haven't shown notable zeal for the fight anyway, and their attitude is understandable enough. Not only does the conceptual distinction between communism and freedom hold comparatively little meaning for most of them; they have also been in this war, with the support first of France and then the United States, practically since World War II.

As for the Saigon governments, if that is what they should be called, they have been unable to win the support of the people or exercise stable rule; the United States, with all its aid and influence, has been unable to promote or maintain such a government since the overthrow and killing of Diem in late 1963. While the Diem regime was obviously no model of abstract democracy, very few governments are that, in Asia or anywhere else, it did manage a degree of stability.

The United States which condoned the removal of Diem, is perhaps too preoccupied with governmental modes and deportment. If we have an important stake in southeast Asia, our policymakers need not to be so inconsistent that the government in Saigon be civilian and virtuously democratic; what should matter, from the point of view of our interests, is that it be an effective government able to invest citizens and soldiers with a will to rout the Communists.

If those objectives prove unattainable and the whole thing blows up in America's face, it is needless to say America's interests will have suffered severe damage. For our part, however, we are not convinced that it has to be catastrophic damage.

The basic U.S. interest in southeast Asia is not, or should not be, solely the preservation of a non-Communist South Vietnam as though it were in a vacuum; rather, the American concern is to keep Red China from expanding—insofar as the United States is reasonably capable of doing so. If that cannot be done with regard to South Vietnam, we still must consider the area as a whole.

In that broader context, failure in Vietnam, if it happens, does not automatically doom all southeast Asia. There are other, and maybe more defendable, areas of resistance to communism and to Red China in particular. Thailand is a large one. Malaysia, currently more directly menaced by Indonesia's pro-Communist Sukarno than by Peking, appears to be a firm one.

The United States does, we believe, have to stand firm against Red Chinese imperialism. But whether the major stand is taken at Thailand, Malaysia, or indeed the Philippines or Australia should be determined by the cold considerations of a given nation's will to fight, terrain, logistics, and all the normal military bases for judgment. If we look only at South Vietnam as the be-all and end-all of our southeast Asia policy, we risk not only profound disappointment but also perhaps inadequate thinking and preparation for the larger problem.

To say we might lose in South Vietnam is not defeatism but military realism, no matter how much it may be hoped that the country can somehow be kept out of Communist hands. What must be hoped most of all, in our view, is that the officials in Washington are paying full attention to Asian strategy in the event they cannot hold Vietnam.

MONTANA'S "WAGONMASTER"

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as my colleagues in the Senate are well aware, Montana has produced a number of distinguished sons and daughters who have achieved fame and success outside its borders. I am reminded of an im-

Appendix

Debate on U.S. Policy on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE McGOVERN

OF SOUTH DAKOTA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, January 19, 1965

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, a continuing and in my judgment, very constructive debate, on U.S. policy on Vietnam is underway. Right now, I believe, there exists what amounts to a deadlock between the state of South Vietnam, aided to an increasing extent by the United States, and the Vietcong guerrillas, aided to an increasing extent by North Vietnam. It would be difficult, and probably impossible, for South Vietnamese forces to win a final military victory, since there appears to be a grass roots cooperation with the Vietcong throughout much of the countryside. On the other hand, it would be equally difficult for the Communist forces to achieve a final victory over the South Vietnamese, with their strong U.S. military backing. The U.S. forces are undoubtedly able to remain there indefinitely and to prevent a Communist take-over in that manner; yet there is raised with increasing frequency the question of whether we might achieve basically the same results, over the long run, by a negotiated settlement which would spare the Vietnamese people the long suffering and economic devastation of continued warfare. It would also avoid the continued financial drain and loss of life now being suffered by the United States.

Few Americans favor an immediate and unqualified pullout. I believe the commitment we have given the leaders of South Vietnam and the concern we have for the people there would make it impossible for the United States to withdraw immediately. Yet it is not too soon to discuss the terms on which a withdrawal might ultimately be possible, and to assess the long-term requirements for the settlement of an issue which is basically political, not military. During the present struggle, we should not remain silent, with bated breath, as it were, waiting for a sudden resolution of the problem, which is most unlikely. Rather, we should use, here in Congress and throughout the country, the existing deadlock to discuss alternative policies and forms of settlement, so that the American people, as well as the administration, will be better equipped to take further action, at an opportune time. Prolonging the conflict indefinitely could only mean continued painful losses for both sides.

In this connection, Mr. President, a debate over U.S. policy on Vietnam was published in the New York Times

magazine of January 17. The debate was between the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and Henry Cabot Lodge, former Ambassador to South Vietnam. Both points of view—"withdraw now" or "fight on to victory"—were presented clearly and cogently. I ask unanimous consent that this presentation be printed in the Appendix following my remarks, in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WE MUST LEAVE VIETNAM (By WAYNE MORSE)

Ten years ago the United States embarked upon an adventure in South Vietnam that was just about 100 years out of date. While Britain, France, and the Netherlands were terminating their rule over their Asiatic colonies, the United States began trying to establish its own beachhead on the Asiatic mainland.

Although present at the Geneva conference of 1954, which drew up the accord whereby France withdrew from its old colony of Indochina, the United States refused to sign the final agreement. So did one of the subdivisions of Indochina, South Vietnam. The United States began a heavy program of financial and military aid to a new Premier in South Vietnam who, we believed, was most likely to preserve a Western orientation. When it came time for the 1956 election throughout both North and South Vietnam required by the Geneva accord, we and our client in Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, realized it would be won by Ho Chi Minh's followers not only in his own North Vietnam but in the South as well. South Vietnam refused to proceed with the election.

In the last decade we have explained our policy as one of helping a free government resist Communist subversion. But South Vietnam never has had a free government. In its 10 years of existence its governments have been picked for it by the United States and maintained by our heavy doses of economic and military aid.

The fraudulence of our claim has been starkly exposed by the successive coups in Saigon and by the piecing together of one government after another by the American Embassy. Leaders suspected of favoring neutrality or any form of negotiation for settlement of the civil war are firmly excluded from Government ranks. The major tools we have used in manipulating political and military leaders have been various threats and promises regarding our aid, which now hovers around the level of \$600 million a year in a country of 14 million people. This sum of exclusive of the cost of keeping 23,000 American "advisers" and large contingents of aircraft in the country.

In fact, our official explanations of why we are there now play down the "helping a free government" line and play up American security and American prestige as the stakes in Vietnam. At least, the explanations are getting closer to the truth, which is that the United States took over this quarter of Indochina in 1954 when the French pulled out. Having intruded ourselves into Southeast Asia, where we never were before, it was this country and not the Communists who made our prestige in Asia the issue.

Our Secretary of State often says that

"China must leave her neighbors alone." Under this premise, our officials have vaguely threatened to expand the war to North Vietnam and possibly China if we cannot win in South Vietnam. But there are no Chinese forces in South Vietnam nor Chinese equipment in appreciable amount. Americans are still the only foreign troops in South Vietnam.

Nonetheless, China has the same interest in what goes on in the subcontinent of Southeast Asia as we have in Mexico, Cuba and other countries of Latin America. She will increasingly resist having hostile governments on her borders, as do Russia and the United States. We recognize and accept this principle as regards Russia, but we refused to recognize it as regards China.

This has been true even though we have watched other Western nations ousted from Asia and Africa by rising nationalism. It was inevitable that once China became part of this tide she would reassert her interest in the governments on her borders. A reawakened China would assert this interest whether she were Communist or not. The more we escalate the Vietnam conflict, the more likely China is to intervene directly.

In South Vietnam we invite China's apprehension, but more than that, in trying to surround China with American bases and pro-Western states, we have to buck not only communism but anticolonialism. One of our many mistakes is to equate the two, especially when antiwhite feeling is directed against the United States. Advocates of a "containment" policy for China, similar to that applied to Russia with some success in the late 1940's and 1950's, overlook the impossibility of maintaining Western strongholds in Asia, no matter what their purpose. What we could do in white Europe and even the Middle East is not to be imposed upon an Asia that is united in at least one respect—its determination to see the white man sent back to his own shores.

With our great wealth we can sustain the current war effort in Vietnam indefinitely, even if it is escalated. But it will never end, because our presence and our selection of Saigon's rulers will always inspire rebellion.

Far from maintaining our prestige in Asia, our present policy in Vietnam is eroding it. The fact that we are losing despite the steady increase in our aid, the addition of 23,000 American advisers, and complete American air domination, has already led several Asian nations to throw out an anchor on the Chinese side. Of the famous dominoes that were all supposed to fall to China if we failed to take up the French burden in southeast Asia, Burma, and Cambodia have already neutralized themselves. Pakistan has made it clear that the aid she gets from us is directed against India and not against China. Japan and India, the largest non-Communist nations of Asia, who might be expected to be the most helpful to us in Vietnam, have not associated themselves with what we are doing there. A few days ago India's Premier Shastri urged a new international conference to negotiate a settlement. He asked the United States not to press for a military decision and urged that we avoid a major military conflict.

Of all the nations touted as potential Chinese victims, only Australia and the Philippines have offered tangible help in South Vietnam. The Australian contribution amounts to some 66 "advisers" and three

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air-cargo planes. The Philippine offer of a force of volunteer veterans was turned down.

That is the extent of the local interest and support for the American view that we are saving all of Asia from communism by our policy in Vietnam. Surely if one of these so-called dominoes believed it, they would be fighting side by side with us in Vietnam. They are not, because they see us having to run faster and faster just to stay in the same place in Vietnam. They see that the bulk of its people are too indifferent to American objectives to resist the Vietcong. They know that sooner or later we will have to leave and they do not want to jeopardize their own standing in Asia by supporting a last-minute white intervention.

There are many ways this country could crawl back from the limb we crawled out on 10 years ago. Through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the United Nations or a reconvened Geneva Conference we could seek to establish an international presence in Vietnam to stabilize and pacify the country while it develops political institutions. Our refusal to sign the accord of 1954 has always made suspect our claim that we were enforcing it.

In truth, our "enforcement" has taken the form of violations far more massive than any violations by North Vietnam. Our jet air forces and bases, our helicopter fleet, the 23,000 U.S. military advisers are all violations of the 1954 accord. So are they violations of section after section of the United Nations Charter, under which we are pledged to seek peaceful solutions to disputes and to lay before the U.N. those disputes we are unable to solve peacefully through means of our own choosing. We have done neither in Vietnam.

A negotiated settlement in South Vietnam is the first solution we are obliged to seek. Of course, it would mean some guaranteed neutralization of the country. That would give its war-torn people the best chance they have yet had to construct a country of their own, something the French, the Japanese, the French again and now the Americans have not given them.

If we fail to reach a negotiated settlement, then the U.N. Charter requires the dispute to be laid before a regional organization, such as SEATO, or one of the U.N. bodies. Both groups have the capacity to police the country, both are more likely to bring it some degree of cohesion than is the United States with its unilateral intervention in pursuit of our own interests.

Some Americans have busily erected an enormous pyramid of disasters they contend would result even from this limited American retrenchment. They see America as a power in the Pacific only if we and our friends control all its shores instead of just its northern, eastern, and southern shores, plus the island fringe off its western shore. Most important, they ignore the impossibility of creating an American foothold on that shore in mid-20th century, communism or no communism.

Many countries, East and West, have accommodated themselves to the end of the old order in Asia. We will, too, eventually. The only question is how much blood and money we will waste first trying to turn the clock back.

WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM

(By Henry Cabot Lodge)

"Pulling out of Vietnam" is exactly the same as "turning Vietnam over to the Communists." Such a course would be not merely imprudent, but actually extremely dangerous.

Geographically, Vietnam stands at the hub of a vast area of the world—southeast Asia—an area with a population of 240 million people extending 2,300 miles from north to south, and 8,000 miles from east to west. The Mekong River, one of the 10 largest rivers

in the world, reaches the sea in South Vietnam. He who holds or has influence in Vietnam can affect the future of the Philippines and Taiwan to the east, Thailand and Burma with their huge rice surpluses to the west, and Malaysia and Indonesia with their rubber, oil, and tin to the south. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand would in turn be deeply concerned by the communization of South Vietnam.

Historically, Vietnam has long played a part in the political development of the Far East. For many centuries it was under the occupation or influence of the Chinese and was used by the Chinese as a means of enforcing their hegemony over the whole of southeast Asia. The Vietnamese did not enjoy this experience and have traditionally done what they could to throw off Chinese overlordship. In a very real sense, therefore, the present struggle is one of self-determination.

But today Vietnam should be seen as one more instance in a long series of events which began in Iran, Turkey, and Greece after World War II; which include the seizure of Czechoslovakia; which led to the Marshall plan in Europe; which caused the Korean war, the Malayan emergency, the HuK rebellion in the Philippines and the Berlin crisis. In all these widely separated places the Communist bloc has tried to subvert and to undermine the free world in order to spread its control and its suppression of freedom.

In opposing this Communist onslaught, the free world has stood together for nearly two decades. One manifestation of our common determination to frustrate the Communist design to conquer Europe was the creation of NATO. Elsewhere in the world we have formed other alliances. The United States alone has suffered 160,000 casualties since the end of World War II in this effort to contain the spread of communism.

This worldwide effort by nations of the free world has not been undertaken out of a simple quixotic delight in engaging in battles in distant places. Nor does it signify a desire to establish a new colonialism or any kind of special position. The war in Vietnam is not only the struggle of a small nation to exist, but it is also an open encounter between the doctrine that "wars of revolution," as the Communists call them, are the wave of the future, and our belief that in the future nations should be allowed to develop their own destinies free from outside interference.

Although the North Vietnamese have their own motives for their aggression in South Vietnam and have played the leading role, they have always been backed by the Chinese Communists. Should their aggression be successful, the Chinese Communists will have seen positive proof that their approach to international relations is correct.

Such an outcome might well lead the Soviets, in their desire to retain the leadership of the Communist bloc, to adopt a more belligerent stance in their relations with the outside world. This would surely affect the West.

It would also be regarded everywhere as a reflection of the inability or lack of will of the free world to prevent aggression. What, for example, would be the reaction in Europe if the United States were to withdraw from southeast Asia in the face of its commitment to assist the nations there?

The state of public opinion in the United States itself would also be affected. Should Vietnam be lost, many voices would be heard urging us in effect to resign from the world, fall back onto our Fortress America and gird up our loins for a contest with guided missiles. This too would be something which neither Europe nor the rest of the free world could ignore.

Because of all these considerations, the United States has undertaken to support the Vietnamese both politically and militarily,

in an effort which has cost us lives and treasure. The effort has not been in vain.

Although we are not yet victorious, we have achieved a stalemate, which is surely much better than defeat. On the economic and social front the United States has contributed to the building of schools, clinics and better farms, all of which are essential to gaining and holding the political support that must be had to win the war. And we try to help in every way in training civil administrators and in creating political energy in the country.

Some have said that despite this effort the war in Vietnam cannot be won. Yet recent history shows that we have been fighting wars of this sort for the past 20 years and that the record is creditable. We of the free world won in Greece, we thwarted the Communist aggression in Korea, we won in Malaya, we won in the Philippines, and we can win in Vietnam. We must persist and we must not play into the enemy's hands by counting on a quick, sensational and easy way out and then being disappointed when it does not occur.

Persistent execution of the political and military plans which have been agreed to will bring victory—provided outside pressures do not become too great. These outside pressures occur in many forms such as the problem of sanctuaries from which Vietnam can be attacked and the Vietcong helped with impunity. Infiltration from such sanctuaries cannot be allowed to defeat the efforts the Vietnamese are making. We will not shrink from taking such measures as seem necessary to cope with it.

Another form of "outside pressure" is the desire in some quarters for an international conference here and now. We do not oppose the idea of holding international conferences as an abstract proposition—if they are held at the proper time and under the proper circumstances—but we think that to hold a conference now would serve no good purpose and would seriously undermine morale in South Vietnam. Consider the reasons:

1. There have already been two conferences on southeast Asia (one on Vietnam and another on Laos), the terms of which were satisfactory but which the Communists violated before the ink was dry. Before holding another conference there must be some sign that the Communists of Hanoi and Peiping are prepared to let their southern neighbors alone.

2. For the South Vietnamese to go to a conference now with a large and aggressive fifth column on their soil would amount to a surrender. A conference not preceded by a verifiable Communist decision to cease attacking and subverting South Vietnam would be nothing more than a capitulation.

3. There is clearly no agreement between us and the Communists on the simple proposition to let South Vietnam alone. A conference held in an atmosphere of bitter disagreement could only make matters more dangerous than they already are.

So-called neutrality is another outside pressure standing in the way of the successful prosecution of the war in South Vietnam. Neutrality that does not include some means of enforcement, that does not include North Vietnam, that means South Vietnam will be alone and disarmed, is nothing more than surrender. It should be opposed for Vietnam just as it is opposed for Berlin or for Germany. It takes strength to be neutral. South Vietnam is not strong enough today to be neutral.

In truth both Vietnams are "neutralized" now by article 10 of the Geneva accord of July 21, 1954, which said: " * * * the two parties shall insure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy."

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This provision was formally approved by article 5 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954, which the U.S.S.R., Red China, France, the United Kingdom, United States, Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam attended.

We must therefore insist before there is any discussion of a conference or of neutralism, that the Communists stop their aggression and live up to the agreements which already exist. The minute the onslaught ceases, there can be peace. At present, the North Vietnamese seem only to understand force, and, of course, when they use force they must be met with force, as they were in the Gulf of Tonkin. They should also be met with the strong and united opposition of the free world.

It seems that conflicts in far-off places are precisely those which have often brought war and calamity to all of us. Manchuria seemed far away in 1931; the subversion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler seemed remote to the United States in 1938. Persistence, and unity in the face of Communist pressure have succeeded in Europe and in southeast Asia, and can succeed again.

Mao Tse-tung said: "Politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed."

The struggle in Vietnam is not a "war" in the sense that World War II—or Korea—was a "war," because total military success in Vietnam, unaccompanied by success in other fields, will not bring victory. A many-sided effort is needed; no single effort will solve the problem; the problem is thus the despair of the headline writer and the political stump speaker employing black-and-white phraseology.

Therefore, those who say that there is a quick solution or a simple solution or an exclusively military solution are doing as much of a disservice as are those who say that there is no hope, that we must pull out and that another southeast Asian conference (added to the two which have been already held—and dishonored) will do other than turn South Vietnam over to the Communists.

They also do a disservice who deny that much has been achieved, that the military program, the economic program, the social program, the informational program and the various technical programs have all accomplished much—have indeed built the spring-board of victory—and that it is the political, counter-subversive, counter-terrorist program which still needs special attention.

It is accurate to say that a glass is half-full of water and it is also accurate to say that the glass is half-empty. To dwell on the fact that we have not achieved victory does not negate the other fact that we have prevented defeat—and that a stalemate is much better than a defeat.

It is not the American tradition to get panicky whenever there is a little rough weather. If we decide only to interest ourselves in the nice, quiet, neat countries (which do not need our help) and abandon all the rough, tough, difficult places to the Communists, we will soon find ourselves surrounded by a rough, tough world which is aimed straight at the destruction of the United States and which will make our present effort in Vietnam seem like the mildest of pink teas.

Law Duty To Criticize

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. W. E. (BILL) BROCK

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 19, 1965

Mr. BROCK. Mr. Speaker, there ap-

peared in the December 1964 edition of the Tennessee Lawyer, a wholesome professional journal, an excellent article by Mr. Olin White, president of the Tennessee Bar Association.

In his timely remarks, Mr. White points out that the judiciary is suffering from an uncontrolled movement toward concentration of power in the Central Government and it is not only a right but a duty of the bar to criticize judicial abuses. Believing this article to be of interest to all my colleagues in Congress and particularly those on the Judiciary Committee having jurisdiction over legislation in this field, I include it in the Appendix of the RECORD.

The article follows:

THE PRESIDENT REPORTS

(By Olin White)

It has always been the view, if not a rule, of our profession that lawyers should refrain from criticizing the Supreme Court of the United States, and other courts.

Surely this is restricted only as to the degree of differences in the opinion of the bar and in the holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States and of other courts. In other words, is this an absolute protection from criticism? I think not, and although I believe that lawyers should in the ordinary administration of justice refrain from public criticism—I feel equally sure that when the courts have gone very far afield and when their decisions are extreme, then it is not only the privilege of the bar but the duty of the bar as leaders to speak out—to criticize—and to seek legislative correction of such judicial abuses, if there is no other remedy at hand.

It is my opinion that it is not only high time, but that we are somewhat late in such criticism and action for the correction of such matters.

We have been faced in the last few years with Federal decisions which not only permit but require the release of prisoners guilty of the most heinous crimes, on so-called technical grounds which to some, at least, appear to be not a ground but an excuse and not a technicality but a triviality.

A great many, if not all, the prisons of this country have a law library (or law books) where prisoners may work upon their petitions for habeas corpus so that a man convicted, sentenced, and whose sentence has been confirmed through the highest courts, may open and indeed reopen from time to time the door to release, thereby requiring the attorney general and other officials to appear and testify about matters and procedure which occurred years before.

The holding that the failure to take before a committing judge promptly, and in some instances 7½ hours, entitled a prisoner to release, and to renew his claims is more than startling.

The number of Federal courts will have to be doubled in a relatively short time to take care of the hundreds of habeas corpus petitions that are filed, as well as appeals or petitions interfering with the administration of the State courts—unless some laws are passed to govern and restrict this subject. Not only do the prisoners file these but the courts construe the law as requiring lawyers to appear and even to make long journeys to appellate courts to represent this man, without expense to the criminal and without expense to the government, hence, at the expense of the lawyer.

Local State courts are becoming more and more familiar with the fact that under Supreme Court of the United States rulings, a prisoner or indeed any litigant may, and many do, remove themselves from the trial court of a State to the trial court of the Federal court. In other words, we once had trial in State trial court, and appeal to State

supreme court, and thence to the U.S. Supreme Court. Now we have a Federal trial court, superseding the State supreme court, as well as a State trial court. This is only one of the many indications of the rapid, and so far uncontrolled, movement toward absolute concentration of power in the Federal Government.

I am also familiar with the unwritten rule among lawyers not to criticize judges for fear that when the criticizing lawyer appears, in some other case, punishment will be inflicted upon him. This will not happen with any good judge no matter what the difference of opinion may be, and whatever happens, lawyers should quit whispering among themselves about these matters and now speak out boldly on the subject.

I have refrained from such direct comments prior to the recent national elections for fear that some person might think my comments were politically inspired.

Space does not permit me further comments, but I assure you that I shall have further comments on the subject in future issues.

Bank Loans to Overseas Borrowers

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. A. WILLIS ROBERTSON

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Tuesday, January 19, 1965

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, in connection with the vital subject of our balance of payments, which is such an important element in our gold reserve problems, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the RECORD a letter I have just received from Mr. Walter B. Wriston, executive vice president of the First National City Bank of New York, together with an excerpt from the December 1964, Economic Letter of that bank, on the subject of commercial bank term loans abroad.

I believe Mr. Wriston's letter and the discussion of commercial bank term loans will be helpful to members of the Senate and the public in their consideration in the near future of these important matters.

There being no objection, the letter and the excerpts were ordered printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK,
New York, N.Y., January 14, 1965.

Hon. A. WILLIS ROBERTSON,
Chairman, Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There has recently been a good deal of talk about the rise in commercial bank term loans to overseas borrowers and the effect of these loans on the country's balance of payments. There has not, however, been enough understanding of the fact that these loans finance our exports. It is no coincidence that those parts of the world which have the highest volume of American commercial bank term loans also are the largest buyers of American exports. These exports produce the Nation's trade surplus of nearly \$7 billion which is so essential to the soundness of the dollar.

I am writing to ask that you take some time from your busy schedule to consider what the imposition of the interest equalization tax on commercial bank term loans would do to American exports and other sources of revenue from abroad. We firmly believe that the result of such a move would be no gain for our balance of payments and

a great deal of lost international business for our country. A detailed discussion of this subject is set out in the December issue of this bank's Monthly Economic Letter at pages 141-143 under the heading "Commercial Bank Term Loans Abroad." I enclose a copy and would be glad to send you additional copies if you wish.

Very truly yours,
WALTER B. WRISTON.

COMMERCIAL BANK TERM LOANS ABROAD
In the world today, nations are exchanging goods in rapidly growing volumes. Our own exports have expanded from \$15 to \$25 billion in the past 10 years. Understandably, the remarkable expansion of world trade has required growing supplies of credit.

Commercial banks in the United States and other principal trading nations extend credits to their foreign correspondents and customers. Indeed, the resources of commercial banks constitute a pool of private international liquidity that is drawn upon by creditworthy borrowers in creditworthy countries throughout the world.

Along with direct investment in bricks and mortar, commercial bank credit abroad has greatly expanded over the past 15 years as private U.S. capital has replaced U.S. Government aid to Western Europe and Japan—aid that had been an essential ingredient during the earlier postwar period in reinvigorating world commerce. In recent years, private financing has received further impetus from the restoration of meaningful currency convertibility among

the principal nations. These trends and developments have in turn strengthened international competition in the field of money and banking; they have also created new opportunities.

Within a relatively short span of time, U.S. banks have girded themselves to play a prominent role in world finance. With the dollar the leading international currency, the United States the world's largest exporter and importer, and U.S. money and capital markets the single most important source of financial resources, this has been a natural evolution.

PATTERNS OF BANK LENDING

American commercial banks engaging in international business extend both short- and long-term credits. According to definitions used by official statisticians, short-term credits are those with a maturity up to 1 year; they are frequently renewed from year to year. Loans beyond 1 year are called term loans. These term loans have been customary in domestic financing in the United States for a quarter of a century and have, since World War II, spread to the field of international financing.

U.S. banks have outstanding short- and long-term credits abroad of \$9.5 billion. U.S. exporters, importers, and industrial and commercial firms also grant credits to their foreign clients; these amount to \$2.3 billion at this time.

Of the short-term bank credits, about \$1 billion are short term, and \$3.5 billion are largely on behalf of customers. An additional \$2.5 billion of the short-term bank

credits represent bankers acceptances. After a long period of inactivity, these have grown remarkably since 1950, with the encouragement of the Federal Reserve System; most acceptances are made under arrangements that involve exports from the United States. Loans to foreign banks and customers today amount to about \$5.7 billion, of which \$2.2 billion are short term, and \$3.5 billion are term loans.

THE ANATOMY OF TERM LOANS

There is general agreement that short-term loans by U.S. banks are indispensable as a means of financing U.S. trade and other international business that directly benefits the U.S. balance of payments. Sometimes, however, the question is raised—particularly by those who tend to blame the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on private capital investments abroad—whether loans in excess of 1 year serve purposes beneficial to the U.S. balance of payments. To assure export financing and "normal recurring international business," the administration's proposal and the House-approved bill for an interest equalization tax¹ exempted bank loans made in the ordinary course of business as well as all obligations maturing within 3 years. Before the tax was enacted last September, however, a provision was added in the Senate giving the President standby authority to extend the tax to bank loans with a maturity of 1 year or more.

¹ The tax and its implications have been reviewed in the April and November 1964 issues of this letter.

Changes in U.S. banking credits abroad

[In millions of dollars]

	Short term				Long term	
	Collections	Acceptances ¹	Loans to—			
			Banks ²	Others		
1955	52	24	40	94	209	
1956	87	137	98	94	411	
1957	-17	255	45	-27	256	
1958	-2	-43	213	125	292	
1959	95	-74	8	32	62	
1960	89	651	-35	22	729	
1961	95	641	224	140	1,099	
1962	-14	93	274	20	372	
1963	146	596	-171	132	703	
1964:					4,576	
January to March	22	90	-207	29	-65	
April to June	25	341	-94	24	297	
July to September	24	-42	6	27	15	
October to December	74	207	124	52	456	
January to March	100	138	103	29	369	
April to June	1	242	67	84	393	
July to August	23	-101	15	32	-30	
Outstanding: August 1964	956	2,840	1,326	919	6,041	
					3,440	

¹ Acceptances made for account of foreigners, including varying amounts of other financing.

² Including central banks and other official institutions.

³ Excluding credits in foreign currencies, which amounted to \$689 million in August 1964.

⁴ Excluding items reported by banks for the 1st time but representing certain credits extended previously. Such items amounted to \$86 million in the 2d and \$103 million in the 4th quarter of 1963. Of the latter amount, \$150 million represented trade credits sold to banks by a U.S. corporation.

Source: Derived from data published in the U.S. Treasury Department Bulletin and the Federal Reserve Bulletin.

The author of this amendment, Senator ALBERT GORE, of Tennessee, stated that it seemed a foregone conclusion that the exemption of commercial bank term loans would be used to avoid the tax and characterized it as an important loophole. In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee last June, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon pointed out that the rise in long-term bank loans had started before there was any thought of the tax and that, in the light of detailed information made available to the Treasury, any possible evasion of the tax through use of bank loans

could not be more than 5 percent of the total bank loans.⁵

Changes in direction of the flow of loans to less-developed and developed countries have been remarkably similar to the changes in patterns of direct investment. Until 2 or 3 years ago, the direction of the flows had been mainly to Latin America and Canada. In recent years, most of the term loans have gone to Europe, particularly to Italy during late 1963 and early 1964, and to Japan. The shifts in the geographic distribution are summed up in the second table.

Over the past year, changes in bank credits

abroad, short as well as long-term, have been particularly influenced by borrowings by Japan. These have grown substantially to support the expanding volume of Japanese trade and business activity. In recent months, the rate of bank lending to Japan has slowed down. As noted in these pages last month, Japan has floated sizable amounts of bonds in European markets.

A HELPFUL INNOVATION

The use of term loans in foreign operations is an adaptation of techniques developed in the United States for domestic lending. As is well known, term loans in the